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Summary
This paper is about measuring social well-being and evaluating policy. Part I is
concerned with the links between the two, while Parts II and III, respectively, are
devoted to the development of appropriate methods of measuring and evaluating.
In Part II (Sections 4-7) I identify a minimal set of indices for spanning a general
conception of social well-being. The analysis is motivated by the frequent need to
make welfare comparisons across time and communities. A distinction is drawn
between current well-being and sustainable well-being. Measuring current well-being
is the subject of discussion in Sections 5-6. It is argued that a set of five indices,
consisting of private consumption per head, life expectancy at birth, literacy, and
indices of civil and political liberties, taken together, are a reasonable approximation
for the purpose in hand.
Indices of the quality of life currently in use, such as UNDP’s Human
Development Index, are cardinal measures. Since indices of civil and political liberties
are only ordinal, aggregate measures of social well-being should be required to be
ordinal. In this connection, the Borda index suggests itself. In Section 6 the Borda index
is put to work on data on what were 46 of the poorest countries in the early 1980s.
Interestingly, of the component indices, the ranking of countries in the sample in terms
of life expectancy at birth is found to be the most highly correlated with the countries’
Borda ranking. Even more interestingly, the ranking of countries in terms of gross
national product (GNP) per head is almost as highly correlated. There can be little
doubt that this finding is an empirical happenstance. But it may not be an uncommon
happenstance. If this were so, GNP per head could reasonably continue to be used as a
summary measure of social well-being, even though it has no theoretical claims to be
one.
It is widely thought that net national product (NNP) per head measures the
economic component of sustainable well-being. In Section 7 and the Appendix it is
shown that this belief is false. It is shown that NNP, suitably defined, can be used to
evaluate economic policies, but that it should not be used in making intertemporal and
cross-country comparisons of the standard of living. In particular, it is shown that
comparisons of sustainable welfare should involve comparisons of wealth. For the
purposes of comparing social well-being in an economy over time, this reduces to
checking if net investment is positive or negative or nil. Writings on the welfare
economics of NNP have mostly addressed economies pursuing optimal policies, and
are thus of limited use. The analysis in Section 7 and the Appendix generalizes this
substantially by studying environments where governments are capable of engaging
only in policy reforms, in economies characterized by substantial non-convexities. The
analysis pertinent for optimizing governments and convex economies are special
limiting cases of the one reported here.
Part III (Sections 8-10) is about policy evaluation. Policy evaluation techniques
developed in the 1970s, while formally correct, neglected to consider (1) resource
allocation in the wide variety of non-market institutions that prevail throughout the
world, and (2) the role the environmental-resource base plays in our lives. In Part III it
is argued that the evaluation of policy changes can be done effectively only if there is a
fair understanding of the way socio-economic and ecological systems would respond
to the changes. The observation is no doubt banal, but all too often decision-makers
have neglected to model the combined socio-economic and ecological system before
embarking upon new policies or keeping faith in prevailing ones. Examples are
provided to show that such neglect has probably meant even greater hardship for
precisely those groups of people who are commonly regarded as being particularly
deserving of consideration. The examples are also designed to demonstrate how recent
advances in our understanding of general resource allocation mechanisms and of
environmental and resource economics can be incorporated in a systematic way into
what are currently the best-practice policy evaluation techniques.
Part I
Reasons for Valuing and Evaluating
1. Means and Ends
In common parlance we use the term "valuation" when comparing objects, and
"evaluation" when comparing the relative merits of actions. Of course, the objects
needn’t be concrete, they can be abstract (e.g. ideas). Nor is evaluation restricted to a
narrowly construed notion of action. For example, we evaluate "strategies", which are
conditional actions that can be personal or collective ("do this if that happens", "do that
if he does this", and so forth). We also evaluate "policies", which too can be personal or
collective. In this sense "valuation" is passive, while "evaluation" signifies more of an
active engagement. We frequently "value" in order to be able to "evaluate"; but not
always: we sometimes value simply because we wish to understand a state of affairs.
This article is about measuring the quality of life and evaluating policies. When
discussing the latter, I shall be thinking of public policies, the sort of policies
governments are expected to ponder over. They involve such matters as the character
of public investment, the structure of taxes and transfers, environmental legislation,
and so forth. To be sure, in speaking of the evaluation of public policies, I mean the
evaluation of changes in public policies. Both valuation and evaluation involve
comparisons. For example, when we ask if the standard of living in some country is
currently higher than in some other, we are asking for a comparison. When we wish to
evaluate a public policy, we have to compare it to some other policy, which typically
would be the status quo; that is, the outcome which would prevail if existing policies
were kept in place. Evaluation involves the consideration of counter-factuals.
The qualification "public" means two, often related, things. First, choice of one
public policy, rather than another, implies one background environment, rather than
another, within which the various parties in society can act. The choice influences the
constraints to which the various parties are subject. So, evaluating a public policy
requires that the likely responses of the economic system to the policy be assessed.
Secondly, the evaluation needs to be conducted on behalf of a large, possibly disparate
group of people, possessing different preferences, values, and needs. This calls for an
acceptable procedure for aggregating the often conficting claims of members of the
polity. It also requires that we identify those features of the consequences of the choice
that are to be used to conduct the evaluation. In short, to be able to evaluate public
2policies we need measures of the quality of life.
But as we have already noted, the need for quality-of-life indices arises not only
because policies have to be evaluated, there are a number of other reasons. For
example, we often wish to know if a group (e.g. women in a country) are doing as well
today as they did in the past, or if one group (e.g. a country) enjoys a higher standard
of living than another. In what follows, I am much concerned with such questions as
these. One of my aims is to develop suitable indices for answering them. I also develop
indices, based on quality-of-life measures, that would be appropriate for evaluating
public policies. As we will see, the most suitable criteria for policy evaluation are not
necessarily quality-of-life indices, even though, of course, the criteria are based on such
indices.
The construction of quality-of-life indices has received considerable attention in
recent years in such publications as the annual Human Development Report of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). But assessing the likely response
of the economic system to policy choice is inherently the harder task. So, even
although this article is about quality-of-life indices and policy-evaluation techniques,
later in this essay (Part III, Section 10) I touch upon "institutional" responses to policy
choice so as to highlight the fact that such responses affect the way policy evaluation
should be conducted. In fact, it can be argued that, at the level of international
discourse on development policies, disagreements stem largely from our common lack
of understanding of the ways socio-economic and ecological systems respond to policy
changes, they stem less from disagreements over what one might call "ethical values",
in particular, they stem less from disagreements over what ought to be the ingredients
of quality-of-life indices.
This last observation may appear odd. Economists continue to stress that
people differ in their judgement on what are appropriate rates of trade-off among
competing social goals. Political differences among people are to be traced to this, or so
the assertion goes.
1
 My own understanding is otherwise. Differences in people’s
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opinions about how the world "works" assume importance in political debates long
before differences in ethical views manifest themselves. I have yet to meet someone
who does not wish to see unemployment reduced or destitution a thing of the past or
current rates of disappearance of the rain forests stemmed. I have also heard many
disagreements on what are the most effective means of bringing them about. As the
philosopher Hilary Putnam has put it (Putnam, 1989, p. 7): "It is all well and good to
describe hypothetical cases in which two people "agree on the facts and disagree about
values", but ... (w)hen and where did a Nazi and an anti-Nazi, a communist and a
social democrat, a fundamentalist and a liberal ... agree on the facts?"
It can also be argued that if development policies espoused by international
bodies have not infrequently failed, they have failed because of our vastly imperfect
knowledge and understanding of the way economic systems respond to policies, by
which I mean, of course, the way people respond to policies and the way ecosystems
respond to the treatment meted out to them. I don’t know of much evidence that the
failures were due to a wrong view of what constitutes economic progress. In short,
even though we are generally in agreement about collective ends, we typically
disagree about the right means to farther those ends. Later, in Part III (Sections 9-10), I
provide examples of this. Nevertheless, even if there is wide-spread agreement on
what counts as social well-being, there is need for an account of what this agreement
amounts to. In the remaining sections of Part I and in Part II, I provide an account.
2. Whose Well-Being?
In what follows, I use the terms "well-being", "welfare", the "standard of living",
and the "quality of life" interchangeably. I am interested here in measures of social
well-being. I take it as understood that we are to build the measure from the ground
up. Since the locus of sensation, perception, and feeling is at the individual level, it is
appropriate to start there and to then build up. It is the individual who matters. I am
setting aside here arguments that have been offered for treating all animals equally
(Singer, 1976). Their acceptance would have far-reaching implications for many of our
institutions. I am limiting myself to measures of human well-being.
A not infrequent criticism of the practice of founding measures of social well-
being on individual well-beings is based on the thought that "the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts". Taken literally, this viewpoint is an acknowledgement that the
processes which shape the way individual values and opportunities get translated into
social outcomes are non-linear, with positive feedback. Usually, though, the thought is
not taken literally, but is regarded more as offering a metaphor for the "body
collective". Now those who espouse collectivist goals (e.g. national prestige) ought to
be required to offer reasons why such goals are desirable. I don’t know of any
convincing reason which does not reduce to a concern over the individual members of
the body collective (e.g. securing pride among members of the collective, thus enabling
them to flourish cooperatively).
Disagreements between religious and secular people (and among religious
people themselves) would also appear, ultimately, to be over facts (viz. over the
existence, character and the will of God). Ethical differences stem from such
disagreements. Religious tolerance encourages people to live their lives in the light of
their own religious sensibilities, so long, that is, they do not infringe on the liberties of
others. These are subtle and complex matters and have been much discussed over the
centuries.
2
 Their wide recognition today, which is perhaps the most far-reaching
influence of the Enlightenment, is a reason why quality-of-life indices must include
civil and political liberties.
These brief observations will be seen to have influenced the notion of social
well-being I offer in Part II (Sections 4-8) of this essay. But the notion has also been
informed by the overarching conception of citizenship, which is taken to cover three
arenas: the civil, the political, and the socio-economic.
3
 Recall that civil society is the
sphere of autonomous institutions, protected by the rule of law, in which people may
conduct their business freely and independently of the State. The civil element of
citizenship consists of the right to justice.
Recall too that by the political element one means the right of a person to
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participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with
political authority, or as an elector of the members of such a body. And, recall finally,
that the socio-economic element is a range that encompasses the right to a certain
share of resources, the right to share to the full in the social heritage, and to live the life
of a civilized being commensurate with the standards prevailing in the society in
question.
Quality-of-life indices in use today are based exclusively on the socio-economic
sphere of citizenship (e.g. UNDP’s Human Development Index; see UNDP, 1998). This
is so limiting as to be potentially misleading. However, in Section 6, where I study data
pertaining to the world’s poorest countries, we will discover that an exclusive concern
with the socio-economic sphere is not wildly misleading for the study of contemporary
societies. To me this suggests that, in the world as we know it, the three elements of
citizenship do not pull against one another, but rather that, generally speaking,
strengthening one helps strengthen the others. If this were more widely true, and I
have no reason to think otherwise, it would be an encouraging finding.
Thus, even although, in developing measures of social well-being, I will
necessarily be thinking in aggregate terms, it bears stressing that the aggregate I
consider is composed of aspects of the lives of individual people. To the extent people
differ in their access to positions and opportunities owing to differences in their ethnic
or religious background, certain consequences would seem to follow, such as the
prevalence of communal strife. Since communal strife (in the extreme, civil war) is
frequently both a cause and consequence of authoritarianism and corruption at the
level of government, the inequalities can be seen manifested in a restriction of civil and
political liberties. In other words, indices of civil and political liberties reflect inequities
along ethnic or religious lines.
To the extent people differ in their access to basic goods and services owing to
systematic inequalities in the socio-economic sphere (e.g. ownership of land), we
would wish to place greater weight on those who lack ready access to them. So there is
an explicit weighting system in any reasoned measure of social well-being.
In recent years much has been written on such weighting systems, for example,
those which are embodied in such measures of inequality as the Gini coefficient (see,
for example, Sen 1992; UNDP, 1998; World Bank, 1998). In what follows, I build on this
literature. So I take the literature for granted here. What I want to do, first of all, is to
concentrate on the objects we would wish to study if we were to assess an individual’s
living standard. Aggregate well-being for a given cohort of people will then be
regarded to be the average well-being of the cohort. The thought-experiment I invoke
to do this is the now-familiar conception due to Harsanyi (1955), in which the standard
of living in a society is deduced to be the expected living standard of someone who
had equi-probability of finding themselves in the place of each member of society.
4
This is, of course, what practical measures frequently amount to (e.g. national income
per head, and UNDP’s Human Development Index (UNDP, 1991)). Inequality among
a given cohort (e.g. between men and women, and between the poor and non-poor)
can then be studied separately and additionally.
3. Why Measure Well-Being?
We need measures of social well-being for at least five purposes. First, there is
need for an aggregate index of economic activity, of a kind which would help one to
summarise a macroeconomy. Gross national product (GNP) has been found to be
useful in this role. Secondly, we may wish to compare the states of affairs in different
places (e.g. countries), or between different groups of people (e.g. the poor in
comparison with the rich, or men in comparison with women), at a given point in
time.
It is the case that in international publications the indices which are typically
used for the second purpose reflect only the current living standard. For example,
when the World Bank, in its annual World Development Report (e.g. World Bank,
1995), compares life expectancy at birth, infant survival rate, and public and private
consumption per head across countries in a given year, one of the points of the
exercise is to compare the current quality of life across countries (see the Appendix
below, Proposition 3). However, in the same publication, countries are ranked in
accordance with their GNP per head. The question is, why? Now it may be that the
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intention is to include in a summary measure a country’s future prospects. Being the
sum of aggregate consumption and investment, GNP may appear to be adequate for
the task. The problem is that, as it doesn’t include the depreciation of capital assets,
GNP is incapable of reflecting future prospects (Section 9). GNP is not the flow
equivalent of wealth (see Appendix below, Propositions 4-5). So it doesn’t quite do to
regard a country to be poor on grounds that its GNP per head is low. As a welfare
measure, GNP per head is neither here nor there and no amount of finessing can
rescue it. GNP is a measure of current economic activity and the prospects such
activity brings with it, nothing more.
The third reason we need quality-of-life indices is that we frequently wish to
make welfare comparisons over time of people in the same place (e.g. the same
country) or members of a particular group (e.g. the poor or rich, suitably defined, or
women). For example, we may ask if a country is doing better today than it did a
decade ago, and so forth. This too is something the World Bank does in its annual
World Development Report, when estimating changes over time in such indicators in
a country as life expectancy at birth, infant survival rate, and public and private
consumption per head (see, for example, World Bank, 1995). The idea there is to
compare the current standard of living of a group of people at different dates (see
Appendix below, Proposition 3).
The previous two reasons for the need for welfare indices focussed on measures
which would reflect the current living standard. In contrast, the fourth reason stems
from a desire to estimate the economic component of the standard of living an
economy is capable of sustaining along alternative programmes. Early definitions of
national income (Lindahl, 1934; Hicks, 1940; Samuelson, 1961; Weitzman, 1976) were
designed to address this latter problem, and the bulk of recent theoretical explorations
in green net national product ("green NNP") have returned to it.
5
 It has been the claim
of this literature that NNP per head (that is, GNP per head minus the per capita
accounting value of the depreciation of all capital assets), is the measure we seek (see
the references in the previous footnote). In the Appendix below, I show (Proposition 2
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and the remarks following it) that the claim is mistaken: NNP per head is inadequate
for the task. I also show that per capita wealth, suitably defined, is the appropriate
index. More particularly, it is demonstrated in the Appendix (Proposition 4) that if net
investment per head is positive (negative), sustainable living standard increases
(decreases). It may not be a coincidence that Adam Smith’s classic was an inquiry into
the wealth of nations, not the income of nations.
The thought then arises that per capita wealth can perhaps also be used in
making cross-country comparison of sustainable living standards. In the Appendix
(Proposition 6) I show that it can be so used, but only under what should be regarded
as very strong assumptions. If the assumptions don’t hold, there is no simple index
adequate for the task. In Section 7 I present a non-technical account of these findings.
Finally, the fifth reason we seek a quality-of-life index is that we need ways to
evaluate alternative economic policies. Criterion functions for social cost-benefit
analysis of investment projects, such as the present discounted value of the flow of
accounting profits (e.g. Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen, 1972; Little and Mirrlees, 1974;
Squire and Van der Taak, 1975) are examples of such indicators (Section 8).
Since economic activity, the current quality of life, evaluation criteria for policy
choice, and sustainable living standard are not the same object, their numerical
measures are not necessarily the same. For example, in a market economy the wage
bill for labour ought obviously to be included if the required index is to measure
aggregate economic activity, as in GNP. But it is by no means obvious that the item
ought to be included if the index is to measure social well-being (Nordhaus and Tobin,
1972; Dasgupta and Mäler, 1999; see the Appendix below). The moral is banal: the way
an index ought to be defined, let alone estimated, is not independent of the purpose to
which it is put.
But before all else, we should make clear to ourselves the purpose of the
evaluation before undertaking it, and we should be prepared to conduct the
evaluation as dispassionately as possible. Making good points with bad arguments
may disguise the fact that there exist good arguments which would have served the
purpose. Here is an example of the kind of mistake one makes when attempting an
over-kill:
9In drawing attention to the enormous inequality in today’s world, UNDP (1998,
p. 30) writes: "New estimates show that the world’s 225 richest people have a
combined wealth of over 1 trillion US dollars, equal to the annual income of the
poorest 47 percent of the world’s people (2.5 billion)."
It should be known that wealth is a stock and income a flow. Consequently, one
should be converted into the other before the figures can be compared. The standard
practice would be to convert wealth into a figure for permanent income by using a 5
percent annual interest rate, that is, to divide wealth by a factor of 20. When this
conversion is performed on the data, my calculations, albeit they are very crude, tell
me that the world’s richest 225 people, having a combined annual income of over 50
billion US dollars, earn more than the combined annual incomes of people in the
world’s 12 poorest countries, or about 7 percent of the world’s population (385
million). This is still a sobering piece of statistic.
It can be argued, of course, that if we seek a welfare indicator, we should
measure well-being directly and not look for a surrogate and give it a different name,
present discounted value of the flow of accounting profits, net national product
(NNP), wealth, or whatever. There is something in this. On the other hand, as there are
several reasons for seeking a welfare measure, for many purposes the most convenient
index could be something other than the thing itself. For example, we could be
interested in some object X, but X may prove especially hard to measure (e.g. because
it involves estimating non-linear functions of observable quantities). Suppose now that
for some purposes X is known to correlate perfectly with Y and that Y is easier to
measure than X (e.g. because Y is a linear function of observable quantities). Then we
would wish to rely on Y for those purposes. As is well known, wealth is linear in
quantities, with the weights being at least in part revealed by observable market
prices. This is the case also with the present discounted value of the flow of accounting
profits. There lies the attraction of these indices.
10
Part II
Measuring Well-Being
11
4. Constituents and Determinants of Social Well-Being
The preceeding observation suggests that there are two ways of measuring
social well-being. One is to study the constituents of well-being (e.g. health, happiness,
freedom to be and do; more broadly, basic liberties); the other is to value the
commodity determinants of well-being (goods and services which are inputs in the
production of well-being; for example, food, clothing, potable water, shelter, and
resources devoted to national security). The former procedure measures "output", for
example, indices of health, and civil and political liberties, whereas the latter values
and then aggregates the required "inputs", for example, expenditure on health, and
resources deployed for the protection and promotion of civil and political liberties.
6
 If
undertaken with sufficient precision and care, either on its own would do the job
(Dasgupta, 1993, Ch. 7*): changes in a suitable aggregate measure of either the
constituents, or the determinants, can be made to serve as a measure of changes in the
quality of life in a society. Along the former route we would measure the constituents
directly and aggregate them in a suitable way, using social weights to reflect the
relative worth of the various constituents (Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen, 1972). Along
the latter route we would need to estimate accounting prices (see below) of the
determinants of well-being in order to arrive at a suitable index for the purpose in
hand, for example, wealth (see the Appendix, Proposition 4). As we have already
observed, wealth is a linear function of the stocks of goods and services. This is why
we frequently measure social well-being indirectly in terms of its determinants, rather
than measure it directly in terms of its constituents.
In practice, neither the constituents nor the determinants, on their own, reflect
what we wish to see captured in any reasoned conception of the quality of life. The
problem is that there would be far too many person-specific accounting prices to
contend with (e.g. those based on income distributional weights) if we were to
estimate an overarching measure using only the determinants of social welfare. At the
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same time, a person’s disposable income, as is customarily measured, does reflect
aspects of welfare and the extent of certain patterns of freedom (viz. the freedom to
choose over commodity bundles), matters which are hard to come to grips with
directly. For this reason, governments and international agencies pursue both avenues
at once, and it is today a commonplace to assess the quality of life by studying a
heterodox collection of socio-economic indicators (see, for example, the World Bank’s
annual World Development Report, for example, World Bank, 1996; and the United
Nations Development Programmes’ annual Human Development Report, for
example, UNDP, 1998). Earlier, we noted several weaknesses in the indices currently
in use. So, in the following section I develop an index which overcomes some of their
limitations.
Well-being isn’t the same as happiness. One could be in a happy frame of mind
under the influence of drugs and yet be in a state which could only be regarded as
reflecting a low quality of life. This and other such examples have been much
discussed in moral philosophy (see, for example, Sidgwick, 1907). Moreover, it is
especially hard to get a quantitative feel for the experiential state associated with the
sense of well-being. The nub is that states of mind are involved. Admittedly, other
minds are not as inscrutible to one as they are commonly made out to be; one’s own
experiences provide the right source of information. Placing ourselves sympathetically
in various possible situations is a way of obtaining the sort of information we seek.
We could, of course, study such objective indices as a country’s divorce or
suicide rate, so as to measure experiential states. This too has been suggested. But such
indicators are seriously deficient. Divorce rates in a society may be low not because
marriages are happy, but because the cost of divorce is, for women, prohibitively high.
Similarly, the rate of suicide picks out features of the lower tail of the distribution of
mental states. We would wish to know something about the entire distribution. A
related approach would be to ask people if, on some specified scale (say, from 1 to 10),
they were happy (see, for example, Frey and Stutzer, 1999). States of mind are not
unmeasurable. In any event, whether we should include indices of the state of mind
when evaluating a person’s well-being depends on the point of the exercise. For
example, contractarian theories of the State (e.g. Rawls, 1972; Nozick, 1974) typically
would not allow the State to be concerned with whether citizens were happy. Such
theories would see the business of the State as being restricted to making sure that
basic liberties are enjoyed.
This said, happiness is far too important a component of well-being to be
bypassed. So it is a puzzle that the contemporary literature on social well-being simply
ignores it. A prior question would be to ask what, in a normal state of mind, is
conducive to happiness? Interestingly, at reasonably high levels of income, income
would appear not to contribute much to happiness. Surveys in a number of western
countries have revealed that substantial growth in per capita income has not translated
into any significant increase in reported happiness (Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976;
Oswald, 1997). A natural conclusion to draw from this would be that, at relatively high
levels of income, personal happiness depends on one’s income or expenditure relative
to the mean income or expenditure of some reference group (e.g., per capita national
income; Easterlin, 1974). But I know of no comparable finding among the poor in poor
countries and would be surprised if there were such findings to be found. It is hard to
believe that at really low levels of income happiness isn’t associated with income.
Studies suggest that health contributes significantly to happiness: other things
being the same, healthy people are happier than those who suffer from ill health (see,
for example, Frey and Stutzer, 1999). Studies in Europe also suggest that
unemployment contributes significantly to unhappiness. Interestingly, in their study
of a large sample from the various cantons of Switzerland, Frey and Stutzer (1999)
have found that associational life plays a role too: people who are more engaged in
civic activities are happier. Assuming that these findings are robust, indices of health,
and civic and political liberties could serve as surrogates for happiness. In poor
countries, consumption too would be presumed to be a surrogate. So if we were to
include these indices in our measure of well-being, we would not need to introduce
measures of happiness directly. This is the route I follow in the next section.
5. Measuring Current Well-Being
The problem, then, is to identify a minimal set of indices which would span
one’s conception of social well-being, be it current well-being or sustainable well-
being. We have noted already that it is important to avoid double-counting. For
example, statistics on the proportions in populations not having access to potable
water are in frequent use when depicting the quality of life, as are statistics on infant
mortality rates. But the two would be expected to be highly correlated, indeed one is
an important cause of the other. If one has the former (latter) piece of information, one
doesn’t need the latter (former) in constructing a quality-of-life index.
It has become customary to make cross-country and intertemporal comparisons
of the quality of life in terms of current well-being. In this section we look at the issues
that are involved in making such comparisons.
Begin with a person. In choosing an index of her standard of living, a balance
has to be struck between the claims of completeness and costs. Leaving aside for the
moment the extent of civil and political liberties she enjoys, there would seem to be at
least three broad kinds of indices one can use in constructing a measure of her current
well-being: her disposable income, her health status, and her educational attainments.
7
Now, these are different categories of goods. Health and education would seem to
embody aspects of what are called "positive freedoms" (moreover, they are both ends
and means), whereas disposable income contributes to the enjoyment of freedoms. So
then why do we wish to mix them up here?
The reason is that someone’s real disposable income measures the extent to
which consumption goods like food and clothing, shelter, legal aid and general
amenities are obtainable by that someone in the market. But primary health-care and
education aren’t this sort of goods. As improvements in primary health care and
primary education give rise to wide-ranging "externalities" when they were privately
supplied, private markets don’t provide an ideal resource allocation mechanism for
their supply. Markets for these goods need to be allied to an explicit support by the
State, in a manner which assures citizens of their supply. Now government
involvement in the provision of primary health-care and education varies enormously
across poor countries. For this reason it is possible for people on average to enjoy a
higher disposable income in one country, and yet suffer from worse health-care and
education facilities than in another. Stating matters in the reverse way, it is possible for
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people in one country on average to be better educated and to enjoy better health than
in another even while their access to other material goods is more restricted (see Table
1, below). Disposable income, health and education indices reflect in their various
ways the current socio-economic status of a person.
The move from the individual to the aggregate is frought with well-known
difficulties. As I am focussing on (current) well-being, averaged over a population, I
bypass inequality measures here.
8
 A problem frequently overlooked concerns the
legitimacy of moving from a person’s disposable income, when thinking of a person’s
well-being, to a country’s aggregate output per head, when reflecting upon social well-
being. Thus, GNP per head continues to be regarded as the quintessential indicator of
a country’s living standard. The gigantic literature on the determinants of economic
growth testifies to this, as do annual publications from international organizations.
Even the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme
takes one of the components of the quality of life to be GNP per head.
9
Personal income is the return on a person’s wealth. But GNP is not the return
on a nation’s wealth. This will make for complications when, in Section 7, we come to
develop the concept of sustainable living standard (see also the Appendix, below). As I
am now interested in developing an index of the current standard of living, I have to
ignore saving for the future. This leaves me with aggregate consumption, which
consists of private and government consumption. But note that the latter is composed
mainly of expenditures on health, education, and defense. We will measure the quality
of health and education directly (by life expectancy at birth and literacy). This means
that we would be counting health and education twice if we were to include
government expenditure on them in our summary index. So we ignore such
components of government expenditure.
This leaves us with defense, a central responsibility of government. But in poor
countries, which is what I am in the main concerned with here, the machinary for
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 The others are life expectancy at birth and literacy. See UNDP (1998). The Human Development
Index has been finessed over the years so as to be, for example, sensitive to gender inequalities.
warfare is all too frequently used by governments against their own citizens.
Moreover, what counts for citizens is their freedom to be and to do, a freedom which is
generally compromised if national security is threatened. As civil and political liberties
are prime components of the quality of life, we must include them explicitly. But this
in turn means that we can ignore defense expenditure when constructing an index of
the socio-economic component of social well-being.
Let me sum up: a minimal set of indices which would span one’s conception of
average well-being in a society would include private consumption per head, life
expectancy a birth, literacy, and civil and political liberties.
10
There remains the question of aggregating the five indices. Here we run into an
interesting problem, one which has been greatly neglected in the literature on living
standards. Indices which reflect the economic component of well-being are strongly
cardinal, that is, they are scale invariant. For example, whether one measures private
consumption in dollars or cents doesn’t matter, so long as we remember that the latter
is one-hundredth of the former. This enables us to say, for example, that someone’s
consumption rate is twice that of another person, or that someone today consumes
three times as much as he did ten years ago, and so forth. But indices of civil and
political liberties aren’t like that, and cannot be like that. They are ordinal. It can make
sense to say that the average citizen of some country enjoys greater civil liberties than
the average citizen of some other country, or that civil liberties have increased in a
country, but it makes no sense to say that civil liberties in one country are four times
those in another, and so on. So we need an ordinal aggregator.
Of the many we could devise, the one best known and most studied is the
Borda Rule. This rule provides a method of rank-order scoring, the procedure being to
award each alternative (say, a country) a point equal to its rank in each criterion of
ranking (the criteria being (i) per capita private consumption, (ii) life expectancy at
birth, (iii) literacy, (iv) political liberties, and (v) civil liberties), adding each
alternative’s scores to obtain its aggregate score, and then ranking alternatives on the
basis of their aggregate scores. To illustrate, suppose a country has the ranks i, j, k, l,
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and m, respectively, for the five criteria. Then its Borda score is i + j + k + l + m. The
rule invariably yields a complete ordering of alternatives. It can be viewed as a "social
welfare function", since the criteria can be thought of as "voters". Of Arrow’s classic
axioms on social choice, the Borda Rule violates the one concerning the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow, 1963). The strengths and limitations of the Borda
Rule have been investigated by Goodman and Markowitz (1952) and Fine and Fine
(1974). There is now a good intuitive understanding of it. So I use it for illustrating
how one could make cross-country comparisons of the current quality of life if we are
restricted to the use of ordinal indices, as we ought to be.
11
6. Estimating Current Well-Being in Poor Countries
Our laboratory consists of countries which were in the early 1970s among the
world’s poorest in terms of income per head. The hope is to gain a preliminary
understanding of the way the various components of well-being are related in today’s
world. Given the context in which such discussions have recently been undertaken, the
restriction to the world’s poorest countries is both deliberate and right.
We consider countries where in 1970 GNP per head was less than $1,500 at 1980
international dollars.
12
 The idea is to look at a snap-shot of the quality of life in each
country. The year in question is 1979-1980. I was able to obtain data on all five
components of social well-being for only 46 out of the more than 55 countries which
should be on our list. Table 1 summarizes the data. Since GNP per head is probably
the most familiar international statistic, figures for this are provided in the first column
of figures (but in parentheses, so as to remind ourselves that the country ranking on
the basis of GNP per head is not being used in the construction of the Borda index).
The second column in Table 1 consists of estimates of private consumption per
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 As the exercize that follows is purely illustrative, I have relied on data collated in Dasgupta and
Weale (1992) and Dasgupta (1993). There per capita GNP was taken to be one of the socio-economic
components of the quality of life. As I have just argued in the text (Sections 4-5), this was a mistake. So I
have re-done the calculations by replacing per capita GNP by private consumption per head. This makes
for some difference in the ranking of poor nations.
head in 1980. The third and fourth columns of figures present life expectancy at birth
and literacy, respectively, again, for the year 1980.
The fifth and sixth columns of figures in Table 1 represent indices of political
and civil liberties in our sample, for the year 1979. They are taken from the valuable
compendium of Taylor and Jodice (1983). Rights to political liberty are taken to be the
right on the part of citizens to play a part in determining who governs their country,
and what the laws are and will be. Countries are coded with scores ranging from 1
(highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). Values for this index are
given in the fifth column of figures in Table 1.
Civil rights are different. They are rights the individual has vis-a-vis the State.
Of particular importance in the construction of the index in Taylor and Jodice (1983)
are freedom of the Press and other media concerned with the dissemination of
information, and the independence of the judiciary. The index measures the extent to
which people, because they are protected by an independent judiciary, are openly able
to express their opinions without fear of reprisals. Countries are coded with scores
ranging from 1 (highest degree of liberty) to 7 (lowest degree of liberty). Values of the
index are given in the sixth column of figures.
Even a glance at the last two columns tells us that for the most part political and
civil liberties were scarce goods in poor countries in the late 1970s. Citizens of 32
countries in our sample of 46 suffered from systems that score 5 or more for political
rights, and those of no fewer than 39 countries from systems that score 5 or more for
civil rights. Theis suggests that civil rights can be, and are frequently, curtailed in
countries where elections are held. The scores reflect severe deprivation of basic
liberties. There were exceptions of course, most notably Botswana, India, Mauritius
and Sri Lanka. But for the most part the columns make for dismal reading. And when
they are combined with the columns which reflect the socio-economic sphere of life,
the picture which emerges is chilling. There was nothing to commend the state of
affairs in a large number of the countries in our sample.
The first column in Table 2 presents the Borda ranking of nations, based on the
rankings in the five columns that follow. Countries are listed in accordance with their
Borda ranks. The ranking is from the worst (score of 1; Mali and Ethiopia being the
joint losers) to the best (score of 46; Mauritious being the winner). For completeness,
country rankings on the basis of GNP per head are provided in the final column, in
parentheses.
It is a useful exercize first to look at the best- and worst-off sets of countries.
From the first column of figures, we note that in ascending order of aggregate well-
being, the 10 lowest-ranked countries in 1980 were: Mali, Ethiopia, Niger, Mauritania,
Chad, Malawi, Uganda, Burundi, Somalia, and Benin. How does this list compare with
the ranking of nations based exclusively on GNP per head? To see this, we note from
the final column that, in ascending order, the 10 poorest countries in terms of GNP per
head were: Zaire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Tanzania, Chad, Mali, Rwanda, Somalia,
and Malawi. The lists aren’t the same, but they are strikingly similar. All are in sub-
Saharan Africa, and the lists contain seven countries in common.
Turning next to the ten highest-ranked countries, we note first that in terms of
social well-being they are, in descending order: Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Korea,
Paraguay, Thailand, Botswana, Bolivia and Morocco (tied), and the Philippines.
The relative positions of China on the Borda ranking (coming in at 17 from the
top) and India (coming in five places ahead, at 12) deserves a brief comment. For a
long while China and India have provided commentators with a classic tension:
achievements in the economic sphere against those in the arena of political and civil
liberties. As can be seen from Table 1, China beat India handsomely in each of the 3
socio-economic indices on our list (for example, private consumption per head in
China in 1980 was more than twice that in India), while India beat China in political
and civil liberties. All this is consistent with general knowledge. However, the fact that
the two finish so close in a ranking of 46 countries means that the ordinal distance
between them in political and civil liberties is large relative to their distance in terms of
the socio-economic indicators. Other things remaining the same, had more countries
managed to squeeze themselves in between China and India in the socio-economic
indicators, the overall ranking of these two countries would have been reversed (recall
that the Borda Rule violates the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" axiom in
Arrow, 1963). On the other hand, had more countries squeezed themselves in between
China and India in the sphere of political and civil liberties, the Borda gap between the
two countries would have been greater. Clearly then, the relative placings of China
and India are sensitive to the aggregator being used. To me this is instructive.
13
How does the list of the 10 top countries compare with the list of the 10 least
poor countries. As it happens, they are very similar. The 10 least poor countries in our
sample were, in descending order: Ecuador, Korea, Paraguay, Jordan, Tunisia,
Thailand, China, the Philippines, Bolivia, and Mauritius. There are 7 countries in
common. We conclude tentatively that, among the poorest of poor nations, rankings in
terms of our index of aggregate well-being are not too different from their rankings
based on income per head.
But this is a qualitative claim, and it will be informative to get a quantitative feel
for the relationship between the Borda ranking and each of the rankings based on the
five components of social well-being. Statistically, how close then is the Borda ranking
to the other five? In order to examine this we look at rank correlations.
Table 3 provides the (Spearman) correlation coefficient for each pair of rankings
from the seven rankings of nations in Table 2. It transpires that the correlation
coefficient between the Borda ranking and the others are: 0.84 with private
consumption per head; 0.88 with life expectancy at birth; 0.72 with literacy; 0.76 with
political rights; and 0.75 with civil rights. I had not expected this. I had no reason to
think that life expectancy at birth would be the closest to our measure of the quality of
life.
At the same time, it is interesting that the Borda ranking of countries is highly
correlated (0.87) with the ranking of countries based on GNP per head. The present
findings imply that if we had to choose a single, ordinal indicator of aggregate well-
being, either life expectancy at birth or GNP per head would do! There must be a
moral to this.
In this paper I have argued that GNP per head should not be considered to be a
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this amounted to counting similar health indices twice. It explains why, using what was essentially the
same data set as Table 1, the two earlier studies found China to have a higher Borda score than India, the
reverse of the present finding.
component of social well-being, that rather, private consumption per head should be.
Not surprisingly though, the link between GNP and private consumption is close: in
our sample, the correlation coefficient is 0.91. It is customary in studies of economic
development to regress GNP per head against other socio-economic indicators, to see
how closely they are related. The last row of figures in Table 3 presents Spearman rank
correlation coefficients between GNP per head and each of the chosen five components
of well-being. Ignoring private consumption per head, the highest correlation (0.83) is
with life expectancy at birth. Again, I did not expect this. I also had no prior notion
that correlation with literacy (0.61) would be considerably less.
Richer countries seemed to have enjoyed greater political and civil liberties. But
the correlation is not overly high (the correlation coefficient between private
consumption per head and political rights is 0.51 and with civil rights is 0.50). But
neither private consumption per head nor political and civil liberties should be
thought of as being exogenously given. Any such link between them as we observe in
international data should only be seen as a link, nothing more. No causal relationship
can be presumed from the data. However, correlation coefficients of 0.51 and 0.50 do
mean that the claim that the circumstances which make for poverty are also those
which make it necessary for governments to deny citizens their civil and political
liberties is simply false. There are countries in the sample which are very poor in terms
of private consumption and which enjoy relatively high civil and political liberties.
Literacy is a rogue index: it stands somewhat apart from the other socio-
economic indices. The correlation coefficient between literacy and political and civil
liberties are 0.28 and 0.30 respectively. These are relatively low figures, far and away
the lowest figures in Table 3.
7. Wealth as Sustainable Well-Being
One may wonder where, if anywhere, net national product (NNP), suitably
defined with all relevant accounting prices, comes in. Recall that GNP is an index of
economic activity, including as it does "gross" capital formation, not "net". NNP is
superior precisely on this count (Section 3). It reflects not only one of the economic
components of current well-being (viz. consumption), it is sensitive also to the
provisions currently made for the economic component of future well-being. In the
previous two sections we studied indices of current well-being. Here we study
sustainable well-being (a formal definition of which is provided in the Appendix,
Sections A.5-A.6). This requires of us to peer into future possibilities. For tractibility, I
restrict our discussion to the socio-economic component of well-being, the implicit
hypothesis being that civil and political liberties are a given. This isn’t a good
hypothesis, but there isn’t anything I can do about it. We still lack an adequate
overarching theory which relates "economics" to "political science". In particular, there
is no workable model in which both future production possibilities and civil and
political liberties are endogenous. So with hands tied behind the proverbial back, I
consider intertemporal output and consumption possibilities, but not civil and political
liberties. In the Appendix a canonical model of production and accumulation,
involving labour, physical, knowledge, and environmental capital is presented. It
enables us to draw a number of conclusions. The discussion here is based on findings
arrived at in the Appendix.
What does NNP reflect? Following Weitzman (1976), NNP at any given date is
widely thought to measure the sustainable standard of living made possible by an
economy’s assets at that date. Why might we be interested in such a result? We would
be interested in it if it enabled us to make NNP comparisons, say between two dates,
so as to infer how sustainable living standards compared between those same two
dates. For example, if the Weitzman result were correct, we would conclude that
sustainable living standard in a country had grown over a period if we were to
observe that its NNP per head had grown over that same period.
In the Appendix below, I show that, alas, this cannot be done: unless an
economy is in a steady state, NNP per head does not measure the sustainable standard
of living (Proposition 2) in the sense that comparisons of NNP per head across time
and communities do not amount to comparisons of the standard of living across time
and communities (Propositions 4-7). This in turn means that NNP per head should not
be used in making intertemporal or cross-country comparisons of well-being. I show
that in order to make intertemporal comparisons of a community’s sustainable living
standard, the appropriate index is wealth (Propositions 4 and 6), which is another way
of saying that, in making intertemporal comparisons of a community’s sustainable
welfare, we should estimate if net investment has been positive, negative, or nil.
Unfortunately, I am unable to conduct the kind of numerical investigation I was able
to offer in Section 6: There are as yet only a few reliable country-estimates of the value
of changes in natural capital over time. Nevertheless, there are reasons for thinking
that many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have seen their assets decline during
the past four decades or so. The development of international statistics on changes in
the wealth of nations should now be a matter of urgency.
14
The findings derived in the Appendix reflect the fact that NNP is not the flow
equivalent of wealth. However, NNP, properly defined, can be used to evaluate short-
term changes in economic policy. This is proved in Proposition 1 in the Appendix. To
be sure, if NNP is to be used for the purposes of policy evaluation, accounting prices
should be used. Recall that the accounting price of a resource is the increase in social
well-being if a unit more of the resource were made available costlessly. Assume for
simplicity that labour is supplied inelastically (in the Appendix I drop this
assumption). In this case, NNP in a closed economy, when correctly measured, reads
as:
NNP = Consumption + net investment in physical capital + the value of the net
change in the stock of natural capital - the value of current environmental damages.
15
Notice that the value of net changes in human capital and knowledge are
included implictly in the first two terms in the formula for NNP. It is useful also to
note that the convention of regarding expenditures on public health and education as
part of final demand implicitly equates the cost of their provision with the contribution
they make to social well-being. This in all probability results in an underestimate in
poor countries. If education were a constituent of the standard of living, and not
merely a determinant through being instrumental in raising productivity, then its
accounting price would be that much higher. We should note as well that current
defensive expenditure against damages to the flow of environmental amenities ought
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Weale (1996).
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to be included in the estimation of final demand. Similarly, investment in the stock of
environmental defensive capital should be included in NNP. These, and a number of
other rules for constructing national accounts are proved in the Appendix. In the
remainder of this essay I explore methods appropriate for evaluating policy change.
25
Part III
Evaluating Policy
8. Valuing Goods and Evaluating Projects
Policy changes are perturbations to a prevailing state of affairs. Investment
projects can therefore be interpreted as policy changes. A project consisting of a dam
would be a perturbation to an economy without the dam. The economic forecast
without the project can be thought of as the status-quo. We could, of course, analyse
the consequences of a policy change in terms of their impact on the constituents of
social well-being. But as I argued earlier, there are advantages in analysing them in
terms of their impact on the determinants of social well-being. The linear indices I have
been alluding to, such as the present discounted value of the flow of accounting profits
from a project, work most effectively if the perturbation being evaluated is "small".
16
What constitutes "smallness" is a delicate matter and the project evaluator has to be
sensitive to it. An investment project can be small in terms of a country’s NNP and yet
have a big impact on the lives of some very poor people; in which case it wouldn’t be
small for them. The way to proceed would be to estimate the net benefits the people in
question would experience if the project were undertaken. The net benefits would
typically be non-linear functions of quantities.
In evaluating an investment project, the need for labour, intermediate products,
and raw materials is estimated, and the project’s output and its impact on the
ecological system are predicted, quantitatively, for each period. Most often, though,
one does not have sufficient knowledge to make precise estimates of the consequences.
One therefore needs quantitative estimates of the uncertainties, preferably in terms of
probabilities. This means that, in general, one has to model the integrated ecological
and economic system.
17
 The evaluation procedure involves estimating the impact of
projects on human well-being - now and in the future. In order to arrive at an estimate,
each and every commodity of the project has to be valued in terms of some numeraire
(e.g. consumption, as in the formula for NNP in Section 7). The accounting price of a
commodity or service is measured by its social opportunity cost in terms of the
numeraire. These steps are common to all methods of evaluation.
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If we wish to assess the impact on social well-being of a brief policy change (e.g.
a short-term investment project), then, as we noted in Section 7, the effect of the change
on NNP (suitably defined) could be used for evaluating the worthwhileness of the
change (Appendix, Proposition 1). For long-lasting projects the most useful criterion is
the present discounted value of the flow of accounting profits. To estimate this, one
first computes the net social profit of a project in each period of its life. The net social
prifit, in turn, is obtained by multiplying the project’s inputs and outputs in the period
in question by their corresponding accounting prices and adding them (outputs are
taken to be positive, inputs are taken to be negative). Using a suitable discount rate,
often called the "social rate of discount", the per period net social profits yielded by a
project are added.
18
 Projects which yield a positive present discounted value of net
social profits are then recommended, those which yield a negative present discounted
value of net social profits are rejected.
Procedures for estimating the accounting prices of goods and services were
much discussed at the World Bank in the 1970s (see, for example, Squire and Van der
Taak, 1975). The theory of accounting prices that existed at that time assumed in effect
that the economy in which social cost-benefit analysis is conducted has an optimal
economic policy in place -, perhaps a second-best policy, but an optimal policy
nonetheless. This was assumed explicitly in Little and Mirrlees (1974). In contrast,
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) developed prescriptions for project evaluation in
economies where projects could be thought of as policy reforms, that is, perturbations
to economic forecasts that may be riddled with inefficiencies and inequities. However,
they offered no formal theory to justify their prescriptions for an economy moving
through time.
19
 Theoretical foundations of social cost-benefit analysis when investment
projects are policy reforms have since been developed by Dasgupta and Mäler (1999).
The theory is presented in the Appendix below. It is important to stress that the theory
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Ahmad and Stern (1990) and Dreze and Stern (1990). But their analysis was limited to what were
esentially timeless economies.
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does not presume economies to possess a convex structure: production non-
convexities arising from economies of scale and scope and from ecological thresholds
can be accomodated. This is a significant improvement on earlier theories, which relied
heavily on the assumption that economies possess a convex structure.
What would those valuation techniques developed in the 1970s and extended
recently instruct us if they were put to work on current concerns? In a recent lecture,
the President of the World Bank has correctly observed that, "... the success of most
projects is dependent on many assumptions extraneous to the project itself. Building
new schools is of no use without roads to get the children to the schools and without
trained teachers, books and equipment... Initiatives to make progress creating equal
opportunities for women make no sense if women have to spend many hours each
day carrying clean water, or finding and gathering fuel for cooking. Seeking universal
primary education without prenatal and postnatal health care means that children get
to school mentally and physically damaged. Establishing a health system but doing
nothing about clean water and sewerage diminishes enormously the impact of any
effort." (Wolfensohn, 1999, p. 8.)
The author is pointing at the need to understand an economic system’s
response to project selection. His examples are about complementarities. Just as a shoe
for the left foot is useless without the corresponding shoe for the right foot,
establishing a health system, but doing nothing about clean water, would not amount
to much. The accounting price of an object whose complements are unavailable is low,
in the extreme it is nil. Projects which produced one without its complements would
register a negative present discounted value of social profits. In short, an integrated
project could pass the test even when its components, each on its own, would not.
9. The Environmental-Resource Base
20
A significant weakness of the several manuals on social cost-benefit analysis
that were written during the 1970s was their total neglect of the natural world around
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us. The environment simply didn’t get a look in.
21
 Since market failure abounds in our
dealings with the environment, markets cannot be relied upon to provide us with
prices which would even approximately signal the social scarcities of environmental
resources. A great deal of work in environmental and resource economics since the
1970s has been directed at discovering methods for estimating the accounting prices of
various types of environmental resources. But in considerable measure practical
methods have been developed for estimating the accounting prices of "amenities" (see,
for example, Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Freeman, 1992), much less so for the multitude
of ecosystem services which constitute our life-support system, such as pollination,
recycling of biomass, nitrogen fixation, and water purification. We also lack a
systematic body of work on valuation techniques appropriate for the many non-
market institutional settings in which environmental resources are known to be
transacted.
However, the following is even now abundantly clear. Indicators of social well-
being in frequent use (e.g. GNP per head, life expectancy at birth, and the infant
survival rate) do not reflect the impact of economic activities on the environment and
the latter’s response to the treatment meted out to it. Since such indices as GNP per
head pertain to commodity production, they don’t fully take into account the use of
natural capital in the production process. So, statistics on past movements of GNP tell
us nothing about the resource stocks that remain. They don’t make clear, for example,
whether increases in GNP per head are being realized by means of a depletion of the
resource base (for example, if increases in agricultural production are not being
achieved by means that adversely affect the services ecosystems are capable of
providing us). Over the years environmental and resource economists have shown
how national accounting systems need to be revised so as to include the value of the
changes in the environmental resource-base that occur each year due to human
activities (see, for example, Mäler 1974; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Dasgupta and Mäler,
1999). We should be in a position to determine whether resource degradation in the
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various locations of the world has yet to reach the stage from which their current
economic activities are unsustainable. But the practice of national-income accounting
has lagged so far behind its theory, that we have little idea of what the facts have been.
It is entirely possible that time trends in such commonly used socio-economic
indicators as GNP per head, life expectancy at birth, and the infant survival rate give
us a singularly misleading picture of movements over time of the true standard of
living.
To state the matter in another way, current-day estimates of socio-economic
indicators are biased because the accounting value of changes in the stocks of natural
capital are not taken into account. Because their accounting prices are not available,
environmental resources on site are frequently regarded as having no value. This
amounts to regarding the depreciation of natural capital as of no consequence. But as
these resources are scarce goods, their accounting prices are positive. If they
depreciate, there is a social loss. This means that profits attributed to projects which
degrade the environment are frequently greater than the social profits they generate.
Estimates of their rates of return are higher than their social rates of return. Wrong sets
of investment projects therefore get selected, in both the private and public sectors:
resource-intensive projects look better than they actually are. It should be no surprise,
therefore, that installed technologies are often unfriendly towards the environment.
This is likely to be especially true in poor countries, where environmental legislations
are usually neither strong nor effectively enforced.
The extent of such bias in investment activities will obviously vary from case to
case, and from country to country. But it can be substantial. In their work on the
depreciation of natural resources in Costa Rica, Solorzano et al. (1991) estimated that in
1989 the depreciation of three resources — forests, soil, and fisheries — amounted to
about 10 percent of gross domestic product and over a third of gross capital
accumulation.
One can go further: the bias extends to the prior stage of research and
development. When environmental resources are underpriced (in the extreme, when
they are not priced at all), there is little incentive on anyone's part to develop
technologies which would economize their use. So the direction of technological
research and technological change are systematically directed against the
environment. Consequently, environmental "cures" are sought once it is perceived that
past choices have been damaging to the environment, whereas "prevention", or input
reduction, would have been the better choice. To give an example, Chichilnisky and
Heal (1998) compared the costs of restoring the ecological functioning of the Catskill
Watershed ecosystem in New York State, to the costs of replacing the natural water
purification and filtration services the ecosystem has provided in the past by building
a water-purification plant costing 8 billion US dollars. They showed the overwhelming
economic advantages of preservation over construction: independent of the other
services the Catskill watershed provides, and ignoring the annual running costs of 300
million US dollars for a filtration plant, the capital costs alone showed a more than 6-
fold advantage for investing in the natural-capital base.
But bad habits are hard to overcome. Even today the environment has not
entered the common lexicon of economic discourse. Accounting for the environment,
if at all it comes into the calculus, is an after-thought to the real business of "doing
economics". Thus, for example, a recent issue of The Economist (25 September 1999)
carries a 38-page Survey of the World Economy in which the environmental-resource
base makes no appearance in the authors’ assessment of what lies ahead. But we are all
so ingrained in our habits that I rather doubt if many readers will have noticed this
fact.
It is worth emphasizing that the purpose of estimating environmental
accounting prices is not to value the entire environment; rather, it is to evaluate the
benefits and costs associated with changes made to the environment due to human
activities. Prices, whether actual or accounting, have significance only when there are
potential exchanges from which choices have to be made (for example, when one has
to choose among alternative investment projects). Thus, the statement that a particular
act of investment can be expected to degrade the environment by, say, 1 million
dollars annually has meaning, because it says, among other things, that if the
investment were not to be undertaken, humanity would enjoy an additional 1 million
dollars of benefits in the form of environmental services. The statement also has
operational significance: the estimate could (and should) be used for calculating the
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present discounted value of the flow of social profits attributable to the investment in
question.
Contrast such an estimate of the value of an incremental change in the
environmental-resource base with the one which says that, world-wide, the flow of
environmental services is currently worth, in total, 33 trillion US dollars annually
(Costanza et al., 1997). The former is meaningful because it presumes that humanity
will survive the incremental change and be there to experience and assess the change.
The reason the latter should cause us to balk is that if environmental services were to
cease, life would not exist. But then who would be there to receive 33 trillion US
dollars of annual benefits if humanity were to exchange its very existence for them?
This is a case where, paradoxically, the value of an entire something has no meaning
and, therefore, is of no use, even though the value of incremental changes to that same
something not only has meaning, it also has use.
An approach similar to Costanza et al. (1997) appears in a Focus article in The
Economist (26 June 1999). In observing the disturbing tendency of compound interest
to make large figures in the distant future look very small today, it is remarked (p.
128): "Suppose a long-term discount rate of 7 percent (after inflation) is used ...
Suppose also that the project’s benefits arrive 200 years from now ... If global GDP
grows by 3 percent a year during those two centuries, the value of the world’s output
in 2200 will be 8 quadrillion US dollars (a 16-figure number). But in present-value
terms, that stupendous sum would be worth just 10 billion US dollars. In other words,
it would not make sense for the world to spend any more than 10 billion US dollars
(under 2 US dollars a person) today on a measure that would prevent the loss of the
planet’s entire output 200 years from now."
We have already seen one problem with this reasoning. Another is its
presumption that social rates of discount are independent of the income forecast
whose perturbation is being discounted. The underlying assumption in the passage is
a massive perturbation (zero world output in year 2200). This would involve a secular
decline in output, at least from some point in time in the future. But social discount
rates associated with declining consumption streams would be expected to be
33
negative.
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 When viewed from the present, negative discount rates amplify incomes in
the distant future, they don’t shrink them. Discounting future incomes produces
paradoxes only when it isn’t recognised that, as discount rates are themselves
accounting prices, they should be endogenous to the analyses, the rates cannot be
plucked out of the air.
10. Institutional Responses to Policy Change
It is easy enough to define policy change (for example, an investment project) as
a perturbation to an economic forecast. It is altogether a more difficult matter to
identify what the perturbation actually consists of. Any system, human or otherwise,
should be expected to respond when subjected to a perturbation. In an economy that is
not pursuing an optimum policy, a policy change can create all sorts of effects that
ripple through without being noticed by the public offices, for the reason that there
may be no public "signals" accompanying them. Tracing the ripples requires an
understanding of the way markets and non-market institutions interact.
Very many transactions take place in non-market institutions. A prime set of
examples are transactions involving environmental services. In poor countries further
examples abound. In recent years long-term relationships have been studied by
economists and political scientists with the same care and rigour that they used to
invest in the study of markets and the State. There is now a large and illuminating
theoretical and empirical literature on the wide variety of ways in which people cope
with resource scarcity when there are no formal markets for exchanging goods and
services across time, space, and circumstances.
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 The literature offers us a lever with
which to predict, in broad terms, the way people, both individually and communally,
would respond to policy changes. Unfortunately, the literature hasn’t filtered through
sufficiently to decision-makers. I want to illustrate what I mean by providing two
examples, one a local miniature, the other altogether grander and near-global.
For many years now, the political scientist, Elinor Ostrom, has been studying
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 I have gone into this literature in detail in Dasgupta (1999).
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the management of common-property resources in various parts of the world. In her
work on collectively-managed irrigation systems in Nepal (Ostrom, 1996), she has
accounted for differences in rights and responsibilities among users (who gets how
much water and when, who is responsible for which maintenance task of the canal
system, and so forth) in terms of such facts as that some farmers are head-enders,
while others are tail-enders. Head-enders have a built-in advantage, in that they can
prevent tail-enders from receiving water. On the other hand, head-enders need the
tail-enders’ labour for repair and maintenance of traditional canal systems, which are
composed of temporary, stone-trees-and-mud headworks. This means that both sets of
parties can in principle gain from cooperation. However, in the absence of cooperation
their fortunes would differ greatly. So, cooperative arrangements would be expected
to display asymmetries, and they do so display.
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In Ostrom (1996), the author reported that a number of communities in her
sample had been given well-meaning aid by donors, in that the canals had been
improved by the construction of permanent headworks. But she observed that those
canal systems that had been improved were frequently in worse repair and were
delivering less water to tail-enders than previously. Ostrom also reported that water
allocation was more equitable in traditional farm-management systems than in
modern systems managed by external agencies, such as government and foreign
donors. She estimated from her sample that agricultural productivity is higher in
traditional systems.
Ostrom has an explanation for this. She argues that unless it is accompanied by
counter-measures, the construction of permanent headworks alters the relative
bargaining positions of the head- and tail-enders. Head-enders now don’t need the
labour of tail-enders to maintain the canal system. So the new sharing scheme involves
even less water for tail-enders. Head-enders gain from the permanent structures, but
tail-enders lose disproportionately. This is an example of how well-meaning aid can go
wrong if the institution receiving the aid is not understood by the donor.
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 In fact, a general finding from studies on the management of common property systems is that
entitlements to products of the commons is, and was, almost always based on private holdings. See
McKean (1992) and Ostrom and Gardner (1993).
Resource allocation rules practised at the local level are not infrequently
overturned by central fiat. A number of States in the Sahel imposed rules which in
effect destroyed communitarian management practices in the forests. Villages ceased
to have authority to enforce sanctions on those who violated locally-instituted rules of
use. State authority turned the local commons into free-access resources.
My second example is altogether more grand and fiercely debated. So, of
course, I will be a lot more tentative in what I say. It has to do with the experience
people in poor countries have had with structural adjustment programmes, which
involved reductions in the plethora of economic distortions that had been introduced
by governments over decades.
Many have criticised the way structural adjustment programmes have been
carried out. They have pointed to the additional hardship many of the poor have
experienced in their wake. But it is possible to argue that structural adjustments,
facilitating as they did, the growth of markets, were necessary. And it has been so
argued by proponents of the programmes. What I want to suggest is that both
proponents and opponents of the programmes may be right. Growth of markets
benefit many, but they can simultaneously make vulnerable people face additional
economic hardship and thereby increase the incidence and intensity of poverty and
destitution in an economy.
How and why might this happen? There are a number of pathways by which it
can happen. Here I will sketch one that I have developed in previous writings (e.g.
Dasgupta, 1993, 1999).
Long-term relationships in rural communities in poor countries are typically
sustained by the practice of social norms, for example, norms of reciprocity. This isn’t
the place to elaborate upon the way social norms should technically be viewed (as self-
enforcing behavioural strategies). The point about social norms which bears stressing,
however, is that they can be practised only among people who expect to encounter one
another repeatedly in similar situations.
Consider then a group of "far-sighted" people who know one another and who
prepare to interact indefinitely with one another. By a far-sighted person I mean now
someone who applies a low rate to discount future costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action. Assume as well that the parties in question are not separately mobile
(although they could be collectively mobile, as in the case of nomadic societies);
otherwise the chance of future encounters with one another would be low and people
(being far-sighted!) would discount heavily the future benefits of current cooperation.
The basic idea is this: if people are far-sighted and are not separately mobile, a
credible threat by all that they would impose sufficiently stiff sanctions on anyone who
broke the agreement would deter everyone from breaking it. But the threat of
sanctions would cease to have potency if opportunistic behaviour were to become
personally more enticing. This can happen during a process in which formal markets
grow nearby and uncorrelated migration accompanies the process. As opportunities
outside the village improve, those with lesser ties (e.g. young men) are more likely to
take advantage of them and make a break with those customary obligations that are
enshrined in prevailing social norms. Those with greater attachments would perceive
this, and so infer that the expected benefits from complying with agreements are now
lower. Either way, norms of reciprocity could be expected to break down, making
certain groups of people (e.g. women, the old, and the very young) worse off. This is a
case where improved institutional performance elsewhere (e.g. growth of markets in
the economy at large) has an adverse effect on the functioning of a local, non-market
institution. To the extent local common-property natural resources are made
vulnerable by the breakdown of communitarian control mechanisms, structural
adjustment programmes would have been expected to be unfriendly also to the
environment and, therefore, to those who are directly dependent on them for their
livelihood. This is because when the market value of a resource-base increases, there is
especial additional pressure on the base if people have relatively free access to it.
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Structural adjustment programmes devoid of safety-nets for those who are vulnerable
to the erosion of communitarian practices are defective. They can also be damaging to
the environment unless the structure of property rights, be they private or
communitarian, is simultaneously made more secure. We should not have expected
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 See Dasgupta (1990) for a theoretical analysis; and Reed (1992) for an empirical investigation, in
three poor countries, of some of the effects of structural adjustment programmes on resource bases. 
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matters to have been otherwise.
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11. Conclusions
This paper has been about measuring social well-being and evaluating policy.
Part I was concerned with the links between the two, while Parts II and III were
devoted, respectively, to the development of appropriate methods of measuring and
evaluating.
In Part II (Sections 4-7) I identified a minimal set of indices for spanning a
general conception of social well-being. The analysis was motivated by our frequent
need to make welfare comparisons across time and communities. A distinction was
drawn between current well-being and sustainable well-being. Measuring current
well-being was the subject of discussion in Sections 4-6. It was argued that a set of five
indices, consisting of private consumption per head, life expectancy at birth, literacy,
and indices of civil and political liberties, taken together, are a reasonable
approximation for the purpose in hand.
Indices of the quality of life currently in use, such as UNDP’s Human
Development Index, are cardinal measures. Since indices of civil and political liberties
are only ordinal, aggregate measures of social well-being should be required to be
ordinal. In this connection, the Borda index suggested itself. In Section 6 the Borda
index was put to work on data on what were 46 of the poorest countries in about 1980.
Interestingly, of the component indices, the ranking of countries in the sample in terms
of life expectancy at birth was found to be the most highly correlated with the
countries’ Borda ranking. Even more interestingly, the ranking of countries in terms of
their GNP per head was found to be almost as highly correlated. There can be little
doubt that this finding is an empirical happenstance. But it may not be an uncommon
happenstance. If this were so, GNP per head could reasonably continue to be used as a
summary measure of social well-being even though it has no theoretical claims to be
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lack of acknowledgement of the role that governance plays in the operation of markets. In an
illuminating body of work, Richard Rose (see, for example, Rose, 1999) has been investigating the way
social networks there have entered spheres of activity they would not have if citizens were to have
enjoyed reliable governance. 
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one.
It is widely thought that NNP per head measures the economic component of
sustainble well-being. In Section 7 it was argued that this belief is false. (In the
Appendix the argument is substantiated.) It was shown that NNP, suitably defined,
can be used to evaluate economic policies, but that it should not be used in making
intertemporal and cross-country comparisons of sustainable well-being. In particular,
it was shown that comparisons of sustainable welfare should involve comparisons of
wealth. For comparing social well-being in an economy over time, this reduces to
checking if net investment is positive or negative or nil. Writings on the welfare
economics of NNP have mostly addressed economies pursuing optimal policies, and
are thus of limited use. The analysis in Section 7 (and the Appendix below) generalize
this substantially by studying environments where governments are capable of
engaging only in policy reforms in economies characterized by substantial non-
convexities. The analysis pertinent for optimizing governments and convex economies
are special limiting cases of the one reported here.
Part III (Sections 8-10) was about policy evaluation. Policy evaluation
techniques developed in the 1970s, while formally correct, neglected to consider (1)
resource allocation in the wide variety of non-market institutions that prevail
throughout the world, and (2) the role the environmental-resource base plays in our
lives. It was argued that the evaluation of policy changes can be done effectively only
if there is a fair understanding of the way the socio-economic and ecological systems
would respond to the changes. The observation is no doubt banal, but all too often
decision-makers have neglected to model the combined socio-economic and ecological
system before embarking upon new policies or keeping faith in prevailing ones.
Examples were provided to show that such neglect has probably meant even greater
hardship for precisely those groups of people who are commonly regarded as being
particularly deserving of consideration. The examples were also designed to
demonstrate how recent advances in our understanding of general resource allocation
mechanisms and of environmental and resource economics can be incorporated in a
systematic way into what are currently the best-practice policy evaluation techniques.
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 This Appendix is based very closely on Dasgupta and Mäler (1999).
A.1 The Model
Consider a model economy where the production of goods and services
requires labour, manufactured capital, and natural resources. The economy is
deterministic. Time is continuous and is denoted by t (≥ 0). Assume that there is an all-
purpose, non-deteriorating durable good, whose stock at t is Kt (≥ 0). The good can be
either consumed, or spent in increasing the stock of natural resources, or reinvested for
its own accumulation. For reasons to be identified in Section A.9, I assume that both
population size and the stock of human capital are constant, which means that we may
ignore them. The all-purpose good can be produced with its own stock (K), labour (L)
and the flow of natural resources (R) as inputs. I write the production function as F(K,
L, R). Production of the all-purpose durable good at date t is then F(Kt, Lt, Rt). I take it
that F is an increasing and continuously differentiable function of each of its variables.
But I do not assume F to be concave. It transpires that we do not need to, given that
our interest is in the welfare economics of policy reform.
 Let Ct (≥ 0) denote aggregate consumption at t, and Et (≥ 0) the expenditure on
increasing the natural-resource base. Net accumulation of physical capital satisfies the
condition:
dKt/dt = F(Kt, Lt, Rt) - Ct - Et. (1)
It helps to interpret natural resources in broad terms. It enables us to consider a
number of issues. We should certainly include in the natural-resource base the
multitude of capital assets that provide the many and varied ecosystem services upon
which life is based. But we should add to this minerals and fossil fuels. Note too that
environmental pollution can be viewed as the reverse side of environmental resources.
In some cases the emission of pollutants amounts directly to a degradation of
ecosystems (e.g. loss of biomass); in others it amounts to a reduction in environmental
quality (e.g. deterioration of air and water quality), which also amounts to degradation
of ecosystems. This means that for analytical purposes there is no reason to distinguish
resource economics from environmental economics, nor resource management
problems from pollution management problems (Dasgupta, 1982). To put it crudely,
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"resources" are a "good", while "pollution" (the degrader of resources) is a "bad". So we
work with an aggregate stock of natural resources, whose size at t is denoted by St (≥
0). For simplicity of exposition we assume that resource extraction is costless.
Let the natural rate of regeneration of the resource base be M(St), where M(S) is
a continuously differentiable function.
28
 We suppose that the base can also be
augmented by expenditure Et (exploration costs in the case of minerals and fossil fuels,
clean-up costs in the case of polluted water, and so forth). Define
Zt = -∞∫tE d .29 (2
In certain applications of the model, Zt would be a measure of the stock of knowledge
at t. This interpretation enables us to connect our model with one where there is
endogenous technical progress. Let us now re-express equation (2) in the more useable
form,
dZt/dt = Et. (3)
There are a number of ways in which one can model the process by which the
resource base is deliberately augmented. Let N(Et, Zt, St) denote the rate at which this
augmentation occurs, where N is taken to be a continuously differentiable function. It
is natural to assume that N is non-decreasing in both E and Z. We therefore assume it
to be so.
The dynamics of the resource base can be expressed as:
dSt/dt = M(St) - Rt + N(Et, Zt, St). (4)
We formulate the idea of social welfare in a conventional manner and ignore
those many matters which arise when households are heterogeneous. We do this so as
to keep the notation tidy. Following the classic articles of Koopmans (1960, 1972), we
assume that social well-being at t (≥ 0) is of the "utilitarian" form, t∫∞U(C , L )e- ( -t)d ,
where U is strictly concave, increasing in C, decreasing in L (at least at large enough
values of L), and continuously differentiable in both C and L.  (> 0), a constant, is the
"utility" discount rate. Our analysis does not require that U be concave. We assume it
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 Z0 is part of the data of the economy. Like K0 and S0, it is an "initial condition". 
nonetheless to be concave for ethical reasons.
A.2 The Analytics of Policy Reform
Let (Ct, Lt, Rt, Et, Kt, Zt, St)0
∞ denote an economic programme, from the present (t
= 0) to the indefinite future. A theory of economic policy capable of speaking only to
optimizing governments would be of very limited interest. For it to be of practical use,
a theory should be able to cover economies where governments not only do not
optimize, but perhaps cannot even ensure that economic programmes resulting from
its policies are intertemporally efficient. Consider then such an economy. To have a
problem to discuss, imagine that even though the government does not optimize, it
can bring about small changes to the economy by altering its existing, sub-optimal
policies in minor ways. The perturbation in question may, for example, consist of small
adjustments to the prevailing structure of taxes, or it could be minor alterations to the
existing set of property rights, or it could be a public investment, or whatever. We call
any such perturbation a policy reform. We proceed to develop the mathematics of
policy reforms.
For concreteness, consider an economy facing the technological constraints in
equations (1), (3) and (4). In addition, it faces institutional constraints (sometime called
transaction and information constraints) which we will formalize presently. The initial
capital stocks (K0, Z0, S0) are given and known. By the institutional structure of the
economy we will mean market structures, the structure of property-rights, tax rates,
and so forth. We take it that the institutional structure is given and known. If in
addition we knew the behavioural characteristics of the various agencies in the
economy (i.e. those of households, firms, the government, and so on) it would be
possible to make a forecast of the economy, by which we mean a forecast of the
economic programme (Ct, Lt, Rt, Et, Kt, Zt, St)0
∞ that would be expected to unfold. We
call this relationship a resource allocation mechanism. So, a resource allocation
mechanism is a mapping from initial capital stocks (K0, Z0, S0) into the set of economic
programmes (Ct, Lt, Rt, Et, Kt, Zt, St)0
∞ satisfying equations (1), (3)-(4).
We now formalise this. Write
t ≡ (Kt, Zt, St), and (5)
( )t
∞ ≡ (C , L , R , E , K , Z , S )t
∞, for t ≥ 0. (6)
Next let {t, t} denote the set of possible t and t pairs, and {( )t
∞} the set of economic
programmes from t to the indefinite future. A resource allocation mechanism, , can
then be expressed as a mapping
: {t, t} → {( )t
∞}. (7)
 would depend on calender time if knowledge, or population, or terms of trade were
to change autonomously over time.
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 If they were not to display any exogenous shift, 
would be independent of t. For reasons to be discussed in Section A.8, we will pay
particular attention to the case where  is autonomous. So let us assume that  does
not depend on calendar time (i.e. it is time-consistent).
It bears re-emphasis that we do not assume  to sustain an optimum economic
programme, nor even do we assume that it sustains an efficient programme. The
following analysis is valid even if  is riddled with economic distortions and
inequities.
To make the dependence of the economic forecast on  explicit, let (Ct( ), Lt( ),
Rt( ), Et( ), Kt( ), Zt( ), St( ))0
∞ denote the forecast at t = 0. Consider date t (≥ 0). Use
(5)-(7) to define
Vt( , t) ≡ t∫∞e- ( -t)U(C ( ), L ( ))d . (8)
The right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (8) is social welfare at t. In the theory of
optimum programming Vt is called the value function at t (Bellman, 1957).
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Before putting the concept of resource allocation mechanism to work, it is as
well that we discuss examples by way of illustration. Imagine first that all capital
assets are private property and that there is a complete set of competitive forward
markets capable of sustaining a unique equilibrium. In this case  would be defined in
terms of this equilibrium. (If equilibrium were not unique, a selection rule among the
multiple equilibria would need to be specified.) Most studies on green accounting (e.g.
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 There are exceptions to this statement in extreme cases, namely, closed economies where production
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(Mirrlees, 1967). In such an economy  would be a mapping from the set of capital assets per efficiency
unit of labour into the set of economic programmes, where the programmes are expressed in efficiency
units of labour.
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 In all this, we take it that Vt is well defined. The assumption that  > 0 is crucial for this.
Heal, 1998) are implicitly based on this mechanism.
Of particular interest are situations where some of the assets are not private
property. Consider, for example, the class of cases where K and Z are private property,
but S is not. It may be that S is a local common-property resource, not open to
outsiders. If S is managed efficiently, we are back to the case of a competitive
equilibrium allocation, albeit one not entirely supported by market prices, but in part
by, say, social norms.
On the other hand, it may be that local institutions are not functioning well (e.g.
because social norms are breaking down), in that the marginal private benefits from
the use of S exceed the corresponding marginal social benefits. Suppose in addition
that decisions bearing on the net accumulation of K and Z are guided by the profit
motive. Then these behavioural rules together help determine . In a similar manner,
we could characterize  for the case where S is open-access.
These observations imply that institutional assumptions underlie our notion of
resource allocation mechanism. Aspects of the concept of "social capital" (Putnam,
1993) would appear in our framework as part of the defining characteristics of , as
would ideas relating to "social capability" (Adelman and Morris, 1965; Abramovitz,
1986), and "social infrastructure" (Hall and Jones, 1999); other aspects would be
reflected as factors in the production functions F and N.
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The crucial assumption we now make is that Vt is differentiable in each of the
three components of . We apologise for imposing a technical condition on something
which is endogenous, but space forbids we explore here the various conditions on an
economy’s fundamentals (behavioural characteristics of the various agencies and
properties of the various production functions and ecological processes; initial set of
property rights; and so forth) which would guarantee a differentiable value function.
It is not easy to judge if differentiability of Vt is a strong assumption. What is
certainly true is that if  is a differentiable mapping, then Vt is differentiable. We
should therefore ask if  is differentiable. This is not easy to answer. An economy’s
underlying institutional structure is incorporated in , and there are no obvious limits
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 The analytics underlying the idea of social capital are explored in Dasgupta (1999).
to the kinds of institutions one can envision. So one looks at what might be termed
"canonical" institutions. Analytically, the most well understood are those which
support optimum economic programmes. What do we know of the mathematical
properties of the corresponding ?
We know that if the production functions are concave and differentiable
everywhere, then for optimum economic programmes Vt is differentiable in each of the
components of . Interest therefore lies in cases where the production functions are not
concave. Now, we know that even if such production functions are differentiable, not
only could optimum economic programmes be discontinuous in each of the
components of , so could Vt be discontinuous (Skiba, 1978). But at points where Vt is
discontinuous, social cost-benefit analysis of policy reforms cannot be conducted solely
with the aid of accounting prices: the relevant "consumer surpluses" need to be
estimated.
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Having noted this, it should be stressed that such discontinuities as we are
alluding to are non-generic. So, unless the optimising economy were by fluke at one of
the points of discontinuity (they are called "bifurcation points"), Vt would be
differentiable within a sufficiently small neighbourhood of the initial capital stocks.
The same could be expected to be true for other "canonical" institutions, such as
market economies subject to fixed distortions. It would seem, therefore, that the
demand that Vt be differentiable would not appear to rule out much of practical
significance. The theory we offer here about the role of NNP in social cost-benefit
analysis of policy reforms is valid for a considerably more general set of environments
than is usual in writings on NNP.
A.3 Local Accounting Prices and their Dynamics
Define,
pt( ) ≡ ∂Vt( , t)/∂Kt;  qt( ) ≡ ∂Vt( , t)/∂Zt;  and rt( ) ≡ ∂Vt( , t)/∂St. (9)
We refer to them as local accounting prices. They measure social scarcities of the
economy’s capital assets along the economic forecast.
How might local accounting prices be estimated? If households are not rationed
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 The analysis that follows can be extended to cover cases where Vt possesses right- and left-
derivatives everywhere, but is not differentiable everywhere.
in any market and externalities are negligible, market prices would be the reasonable
estimates. However, when households are rationed or externalities are rampant,
estimating local accounting prices involves more complicated work. For example, in
the presence of environmental externalities market prices need to be augmented by the
external effects (see, for example, Freeman, 1992, for an excellent account of current
evaluation techniques). If households are rationed, one has to estimate "willingness-to-
pay". And so on. We will presently show that NNP, computed on the basis of local
accounting prices, can be used to evaluate short-term policy reform.
What are the dynamics of local accounting prices? To study this, note that the
current-value Hamiltonian associated with  can be expressed as
Ht = U(Ct, Lt) + pt(F(Kt, Lt, Rt) - Ct - Et) + qtEt + rt(M(St) - Rt + N(Et, Zt, St)). (10)
Recall equation (8), which we re-write here as:
Vt( , t) ≡ t∫∞e- ( -t)U(C , L )d . (11)
Vt is social well-being at t. Differentiating Vt with respect to t we obtain
dVt/dt = Vt - U(Ct, Lt). (12)
But Vt = Vt( , t). Using (9), we conclude also that
dVt/dt = ptdKt/dt + qtdZt/dt + rtdSt/dt + ∂Vt/∂t. (13)
Now combine equations (10), (12)-(13) to obtain
Ht = Vt - ∂Vt/∂t. (14)
We can use equations (9) and (14) to conclude that
dpt/dt = - ∂Ht/∂Kt + pt; dqt/dt = - ∂Ht/∂Zt + qt; and drt/dt = - ∂Ht/∂St + rt.(15)
The equations embodied in (15) define the dynamics of local accounting prices. It will
be noticed that they are formally the same as the Pontryagin conditions for the
evolution of accounting prices in an optimizing economy. Note also that all future
effects on the economy of changes in the structure of assets are reflected in local
accounting prices. That is why they are useful objects.
As  has been assumed not to depend on calendar time, Vt does not depend on
it either. So equation (14) reduces to
Ht = Vt.
Equation (16) is fundamental in intertemporal welfare economics. It says that the
Hamiltonian equals the return on social well-being even in a non-optimizing economy.
A.4 Using NNP to Evaluate Short-Term Policy Reforms
Recall that  is being assumed not to depend on calendar time. Let us now
think of a short-term policy reform as a perturbation to  over the short interval [0, ].
The perturbation is expressed as . During [0, ] the resource allocation mechanism is
denoted as (  + ). From  onward the economy is assumed to be governed by 
again. Note now that if the reform were undertaken, the economic variables during [0,
] would be slightly perturbed ((Ct + Ct) rather than Ct, and so forth). Note too that at
 stocks of capital assets would be slightly different from what they would have been
had the reform not been undertaken.
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Let the stocks at  be (  + ) as a consequence of the short-term reform. The
change in V0 arising from the reform can then be expressed as 
V0 = V0( + , 0) - V0( , 0)
    = 0∫ e- t[U(C( + ), L( + )) - U(C( ), L( ))]dt + e- [V ( , + ) - V ( , )] (17)
On using equation (9) and the accumulation equations (1), (3) and (4), equation
(17) can be expressed as:
V0 = e
-
(UC C + UL L) + e
-
(VK K  + VZ Z  + VS S ) + ( ), (18)
where ( ) is an error term with the property that [ ( )/ ] → 0 as  → 0.
35
Equation (18) is simple to interpret. A policy reform undertaken during [0, ]
has two effects on V0. First, the reform affects consumption and leisure during the
period of the reform. Second, it affects the asset structure of the economy at , when
the reform ends. The right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (A.18) measures the combined
effect of the two sets of changes on V0.
Consider now the perturbation to the asset structure at  as a consequence of
the short-term reform. Observe that
K  = 0∫ (dKt/dt)dt = (dKt/dt)t=0 + ( ),
where ( ) is an error term with the property that [ ( )/ ] → 0 as  → 0.
Perturbations to Z  and S  can be estimated in a similar manner. Therefore, equation
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 It is here that we are invoking the assumption that  is a differentiable mapping. Seierstad and
Sydsaeter (1987) offers a rigorous account of the reasoning involved here.
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 UC and UL are evaluated at t=0. VK is the partial derivative of V with respect to K at t=0, and so forth.
I have now dropped writing the dependence of the economic forecast on . This saves on notation.
(18) can be re-written as
V0/  = e
-
(UC C + UL L + p0 (dKt/dt)t=0 + q0 (dZt/dt)t=0 + r0 (dSt/dt)t=0) +
( ), (19)
where ( ) is an error term with the property that ( ) → 0 as  → 0. The left-hand-
side (LHS) of (19) is the change in social well-being per unit of time during [0, ]. As
we are interested in small perturbations, we let  → 0. The LHS of equation (19) then
becomes the change in social welfare occasioned by the short-term reform, and the
RHS tends in the limit to:
UC C0 + UL L0 + p0 (dKt/dt)t=0 + q0 (dZt/dt)t=0 + r0 (dSt/dt)t=0. (20)
Choose consumption as numeraire and write
n0 = -UL/UC; m0 = p0/UC; u0 = q0/UC; and v0 = r0/UC.
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On dividing expression (20) by UC, we obtain
C0 - n0 L0 + m0 (dKt/dt)t=0 + u0 (dZt/dt)t=0 + v0 (dSt/dt)t=0. (21)
Now use equations (1), (3) and (4) to convert expression (21) into:
 C0 - n0 L0 + m0 (F(Kt,Lt,Rt)-Ct-Et)t=0 + u0 (Et)t=0 + v0 (M(St)-Rt + N(Et,Zt,St))t=0.
(22)
If expression (21), or equivalently (22), is positive, the short-term reform increases
social welfare, so it is desirable; if it is negative, the reform decreases social welfare, so
it is undesirable. Define
 t ≡ UCCt + ULLt + ptdKt/dt + qtdZt/dt + rtdSt/dt, (23a)
and thereby
_t ≡ Ct - ntLt + mtdKt/dt + utdZt/dt + vtdSt/dt. (23b)
If the right-hand-sides of equations (23a,b) have a familiar ring to them, it is because
they represent NNP at t (in utility and consumption numeraires, respectively),
measured in local accounting prices. Observe now that expression (21) is the change in
NNP at t = 0 occasioned by the short-term policy reform at t = 0. So we have
Proposition 1: A short-term policy reform increases social well-being if and only
if it registers an increase in net national product measured in local accounting prices.
Note that NNP as defined here is not NNP as it is usually defined.
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 Since the economic programme sustained by  is not a first-best, m0 is typically not equal to 1.
Conventional NNP is the sum of aggregate consumption and net investment in
physical capital, with both measured at market prices. Expressions (23a,b) tell us that
all components of NNP should be valued at the local accounting prices given in
equation (9), and that the accounting value of net investment in the stocks of all
durable capital goods (manufactured, natural, human, and knowledge capital) should
be included in NNP. The NNP we are studying here is "green NNP".
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Note that autonomous changes in  would not affect our result. Being
exogenous, such changes would be unaffected by elementary policy reforms, so they
are irrelevant for social cost-benefit analysis of policy reform.
The policy reforms we have envisaged here are confined to a short interval. But
what if a reform were small but irreversible (e.g. a small permanent change in fuel
tax)?
In Section A.9 (Proposition 8) we show how accounting prices can be used to construct
indices with which one may evaluate the desirability of such a reform. The indices
developed there are linear in quantities. If those indices were not put to use (Johansson
and Löfgren, 1996), future changes in consumer surpluses would need to be estimated
for the purposes of social cost-benefit analysis. This is because a permanent reform, no
matter how small, would have cumulative effects on the size of capital stocks.
How are short-term policy reforms related to optimum planning? Consider an
indefinite sequence of such reforms at every t, each of which increases NNP at t, where
NNP is computed at the prevailing local accounting prices. We take it that the entire
sequence is conducted in a counter-factual manner; that is, as a tat nnement. Such an
adjustment process is called a "gradient process" (it is also called the "hill-climbing
method"). So far we have not needed to assume convexity of the production possibility
set. Now we do. In a well-known paper, Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) proved in the
context of a finite-dimensional economy that, provided the set of production
possibilities has a sufficiently convex structure, the gradient process converges to the
optimum. A corresponding result for our model economy would be harder to prove,
given that we are considering infinite-dimensional consumption streams. Our
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 Dasgupta and Mäler (1991), Mäler (1991), and Dasgupta, Kriström and Mäler (1999) contain a more
detailed account of the various components of NNP.
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conjecture is that, despite this, a sequence of short-term policy reforms in the form of a
suitably defined gradient process would converge to the optimum economic
programme if the economy had a strong convex structure.
A.5 The Hamiltonian as Constant-Equivalent Utility
In the previous section we showed that NNP can be used as an index for
conducting social cost-benefit analysis of short-term policy reforms. But the theoretical
literature on green NNP has been directed toward a quite different end (see especially
Weitzman, 1998). It has argued that NNP measures "constant-equivalent
consumption". We now look into this interpretation. In order to do that we have to
assume that Vt is differentiable everywhere. So we do so.
Continue to assume that ∂Vt/∂t = 0. Since
[t∫∞e- ( -t)d ] = 1, equation (15) can be written as
Ht = Ht{ [t∫∞e- ( -t)d ]} = [t∫∞e- ( -t)Htd ] = Vt,
from which we have
Ht[t∫∞e- ( -t)d ] = t∫∞e- ( -t)Htd  = Vt ≡ t∫∞e- ( -t)U(C , L )d . (24)
Equation (24) can be summarized as:
Proposition 2: Along any economic programme the Hamiltonian at each date
equals the constant-equivalent flow of utility starting from that date.
This result was proved for optimum economic programmes by Weitzman
(1976), who restricted his analysis to linear utility functions (specifically that U(C,L) =
C). Since in this case the Hamiltonian is NNP, Weitzman interpreted NNP as the
constant-equivalent consumption. The interpretation is today in wide usage.
A.6 Social Well-Being and the Concept of Sustainability
World Commission (1987) defined "sustainable development" as an economic
programme in which, loosely speaking, the well-being of future generations is not
jeopardized. There are a number of possible interpretations of this.
38
 Consider the
following:
(a) An economic development is sustainable if dUt/dt ≥ 0, where U0 ≥ lim Ut as t
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 See Pezzey (1992) for a thorough treatment. It should be noted that to ask if economic development
is sustainable is different from asking if a given level of consumption is sustainable. See below in the text.
 
→ -0.
(b) An economic development is sustainable if dUt/dt ≥ 0.
(c) An economic development is sustainable if dVt/dt ≥ 0,
where Vt( , t) ≡ t∫∞e- ( -t)U(C , L )d .
It is clear that (a) lacks ethical foundation. For example, it may be desirable to
reduce U in the short run in order to accumulate assets in order that the flow of U is
still higher in the future. In this sense (b) offers greater flexibility in ethical reasoning: it
permits initial sacrifices in the current standard of living, U (a burden assumed by the
generation engaged in the reasoning), but requires that no future generation should
have to experience a decline in their standard of living.
Consider the resource allocation mechanism . The mechanism allows one to
make an economic forecast. Suppose (b) were to be adopted as the definition of
sustainable development. Now
dUt/dt = UCdCt/dt + ULdLt/dt.  (25)
From equation (25) we may conclude with:
Proposition 3: If sustainable development is taken to mean that, starting from
now, utility must never decline, then an economic programme corresponds to
sustainable development if, and only if, the value of changes in the flow of
consumption services is always non-negative.
A.7 Comparisons of Social Welfare Across Time
In contrast to (b), the focus of (c) as a notion of sustainable development is social
well-being, V. The criterion permits the first generation to make initial sacrifices in V
(relative to the past), but requires that social well-being should never decline in the
future. Note that, while (b) implies (c), (c) does not imply (b).
39
 In short, (c) is more
general. In what follows, we adopt (c) as our notion of sustainable development and
develop criteria for judging if a given economic programme represents sustainable
development.
Continue to assume that ∂Vt/∂t = 0. Differentiating both sides of equation (15)
with respect to time, we have
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 For an arbitrary  this is a trivial matter to confirm. Interestingly, Asheim (1994) has identified cases
where even an optimum economic programme may satisfy (c), while violating (b).
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dHt/dt = dVt/dt.
Use (23b) to define
It
K
 ≡ ptdKt/dt; It
Z
 ≡ qtdZt/dt; and It
S
 ≡ rtdSt/dt, (27)
which are net investments in the three types of capital assets, respectively, expressed
in utility numeraire. We may then define aggregate net investment as,
It = It
K
 + It
Z
 + It
S
.
40
(28)
It follows from equations (10), (13) and (26)-(28) that
UCdC/dt + ULdL/dt + dIt/dt = It. (29)
Equation (29) enables us to obtain two alternative indicators of sustainable
development. The first can be obtained from the RHS of equation (29). For it implies
Proposition 4: An economic programme increases social well-being over time if,
and only if, along the programme net investment in the economy’s capital assets is
always positive.
41
The result has intuitive appeal. It says that social welfare is higher today than it
was yesterday if the economy is wealthier today. Here, an economy’s "wealth" is
interpreted as the accounting value of all its capital assets, and wealth comparisons are
made at constant prices. In a famous article Samuelson (1961) argued in connection
with national income accounting that welfare comparisons should deal with "wealth-
like" entities. Proposition 4 formalizes that insight.
Note, however, that what we have obtained is an equivalence result:
Proposition 4 cannot on its own tell us if sustainable development is feasible. Whether
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 Note that the summation in equation (28) does not imply any assumptions regarding substitution
possibilities among the three kinds of capital assets. Whatever substitution possibilities there may be
would be reflected in the local accounting prices.
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 This result, shown to be a property of optimum economic programmes, originated in Solow (1974,
1992) and Hartwick (1977), who determined the investment rule that would sustain the maximum
constant utility stream, and in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 10), who showed in the context of a model
economy consisting of manufactured capital and an exhaustible resource that, along an optimum
economic programme social well-being is an increasing function of time if  = 0 and that this requires net
savings to be positive. Pearce, Hamilton and Atkinson (1996) suggested the use of the rule we have
obtained in the text for practical purposes, but offered no proof that the suggestion is valid. Serageldin
(1995) has reported empirical work done at the World Bank on the use of the rule. See also World Bank
(1996).
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the economy is capable of growing wealthier indefinitely depends, among other
things, on the extent to which different assets are substitutable in production.
42
An equivalent way of characterising sustainable development is to use the LHS
of equation (29). We state the result as:
Proposition 5: Social welfare increases (decreases) over a short interval of time
if, and only if, during the interval the value of net changes in the flow of consumption
services plus the change in the value of net aggregate investment is positive (negative).
For making intertemporal welfare comparisons it is customary to compare
NNP over time at constant prices. Proposition 5 says that this is not a correct
procedure unless the economy is stationary (i.e. dpt/dt = dqt/dt = drt/dt = 0). We
conclude that intertemporal NNP comparisons are far less informative about changes
in social welfare over time than is commonly believed. Indeed, they would be highly
misleading indicators if relative prices were changing significantly. Note that this is
consistent with Proposition 1, which says that NNP provides a valid measure of the
impact on social well-being of short-term policy reforms.
A.8 Comparisons of Social Welfare Across Space
In both popular and academic writings cross-country comparisons of GNP per
head are today a commonplace method for comparing well-being across countries.
The analysis in the previous section suggests not only that this practice is wrong, but
also that replacing GNP by NNP would not rescue matters. So the question is what
index should be used instead? We look into this.
It is simplest to consider a continuum of closed economies, parametrized by x (a
scalar).
43
 We may interpret differences among economies in terms of differences in
initial endowments, or behavioural characteristics, or the resource allocation
mechanisms guiding them. But in order to make meaningful comparisons of social
well-being, we must be able to ascribe the same value-function to all countries, that is,
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 For an account of this, see Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 7). The problem is deeper than was
recognized in that work, since substitutability involves substitutability not merely in production, but also
in consumption. On this see Dasgupta, Levin, Lubchenco and Mäler (1999).
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 I assume a continuum of economies in order to make use of the calculus. It simplifies the
computations. The analysis that follows can be easily adapted for the case where there is a discrete
number of economies.
the same utility function U(.) and the same .
Consider a date when the cross-country comparisons are to be made. To keep
the notation simple, we drop the time subscript. Let Hx be the Hamiltonian in country
x and Vx the value function there. Recall equation (15). In the present case it reads as Hx
= Vx. An argument identical to the one establishing equation (29) then yields
[pxdKx/dx + qxdZx/dx + rxdSx/dx + ∂Vx/∂x] = UCdCx/dx + ULdLx/dx + dIx/dx
+ ∂Hx/∂x, (30)
where Ix is net aggregate investment in country x.
For tractability, the interesting special case to consider is ∂Vx/∂x = ∂Hx/∂x = 0.44
From the LHS of equation (30) we conclude:
Proposition 6: Social well-being in a country is higher (lower) than in any of its
immediate neighbours if in the aggregate it is wealthier (less wealthy).
Proposition 6 formalizes the insight in Samuelson (1961) that in making welfare
comparisons across countries, one should compare their wealths. It corresponds to
Proposition 4.
An equivalent indicator for making welfare comparisons can be obtained from
the RHS of equation (30):
Proposition 7: Social well-being in a country is higher (lower) than in any of its
immediate neighbours if the value of the difference in the flow of consumption
services between them plus the difference in the value of aggregate net investment
between them is positive (negative).
Notice that the recommendation in Proposition 7 (which corresponds to
Proposition 5) would not amount to NNP comparisons across countries unless local
accounting prices were the same (i.e. dpx/dx = dqx/dx = drx/dx = 0). I conclude that
cross-country comparisons of NNP tell us nothing about differences in social well-
being excepting under empirically uninteresting circumstances.
Equation (30) is exact, but the pair of (linear) indicators we have obtained in
Propositions 6 and 7 serve their purpose accurately only when ∂Vx/∂x = 0. I believe
this to be a strong condition. If, as we suspect is the case, ∂Vx/∂x is not even
                                                
     
44
 The condition requires that the same resource allocation mechanism prevails in all countries. The
condition is strong.
approximately zero, there are no linear indices to be had for making cross-country
welfare comparisons.
A.9 Evaluation of Permanent Policy Change
The technique we have developed for making cross-country comparisons of
social well-being can also be used for evaluating the desirability of a permanent policy
reform, or of a permanent change in some parameter of the economy. In keeping with
the notation introduced in section 4, let  be this parameter (e.g. the given resource
allocation mechanism). Then, retracing the arguments there, we may write equation
(16) as
Ht( ) = Vt( ).     
     (31)
Using equations (27)-(29), we obtain
dVt( )/d  = dHt( )/d  = UCdCt( )/d  + ULdLt( )/d  + dIt( )/d . (32)
From equation (32) we have
Proposition 8: If the value of the changes in consumption services plus the change in
the value of net investment occasioned by a permanent change in a parameter
characterising an economy is positive (negative), social well-being increases
(decreases).
A.10 Technological Change and Growth Accounting
How should NNP be computed in the presence of technical change? Note first
that resource augmentation, N, in equation (4) could itself be regarded as a form of
technical progress. This said, it must also be granted that the growth and decay of
knowledge involve wider considerations. For example, it has been customary in the
economics literature to regard technical progress as shifts in production functions. In
what follows I explore this route by introducing technical progress in the production
of the final good in the model of Section A.3.
We need to extend our notation. Denote by E1t and E2t expenditures on resource
augmentation and on generalized research and development (R & D), respectively.
Now define Z1t and Z2t by the equations
dZ1t/dt = E1t, (33)
and dZ2t/dt = E2t. (34)
Z1 and Z2 can be thought of as two types of knowledge. Denote the resource
augmentation function as N(E1, Z1, S) and imagine that output of the produced
consumption good at t can be expressed as
Yt = e
t
Q(Z2t)F(Kt, Lt, Rt), (35)
where  ≥ 0 and Q′(Z2) ≥ 0. Technical progress in the production of the final good
appears here as the term e
t
Q(Z2t). It combines exogenous factors ( ) with endogenous
ones (Z2).
Let consumption be the numeraire, u1 and u2 the local accounting prices of Z1
and Z2, respectively, and let the remaining local accounting prices be denoted as in
Section A.5. Retracing the arguments leading to (23b), it is a simple matter to conclude
that NNP reads as:
_t = Ct - ntLt + mtdKt/dt + u1tdZ1t/dt + u2tdZ2t/dt + vtdSt/dt. (36)
Similarly one can confirm that the discussion in Section A.5 on the evaluation of
short-term policy reform remains unchanged in the presence of technical change.
The question remains: what factors contribute to changes in GNP over time? To
see what the answer could be, consider that GNP in our model economy is given by
(35). Differentiating both sides of equation (35) with respect to t, re-arranging terms,
and dropping the time subscript from variables for the sake of notational simplicity,
we obtain the growth accounting identity as
(dY/dt)/Y ≡  + (Q′(Z2)dZ2/dt)/Q(Z2) + (FKdK/dt)/F + (FLdL/dt)/F +
(FRdR/dt)]/F. (37)
The sum of the first two terms on the RHS of equation (37) measures the
percentage rate of change in "total factor productivity", while the remaining terms
together represent the contributions of changes in the "factors of production" to the
percentage rate of change in GNP. Since  is an exogenous factor, it is unexplained
within the model. For this reason it is called the "residual". When it is not zero,  could
well be the most important determinant of ∂Vt/∂t.
In a famous article, Solow (1957) used a reduced-form of the production
function in (35) to estimate the contribution of changes in the factors of production to
growth of non-farm GNP per "man-hour" in the US economy over the period 1909-
1949, and discovered that it was a mere 12 percent of the average annual rate of
growth.
45
 In other words, 88 percent of the growth was attributable to the residual.
(Solow’s estimate of  was 1.5 percent per year.) A significant empirical literature since
then has shown that when K is better measured (e.g. by accounting for changes in the
utilization of capacity and changes in what is embodied in capital; see footnote 28
below) and when account is taken of human-capital formation, the residual is small for
the non-farm sector in the US economy.
46
This is congenial to intuition. We should doubt if it is prudent to postulate
everlasting increases in total factor productivity, let alone in per capita output. To do
so would be to place an enormous burden of proof on an experience which is not
much more than a few hundred years old. Extrapolation into the past is a sobering
exercise: over the long haul of time (say, a few thousand years), the residual has been
not much more than zero.
It is in any case hard to believe that serendipity, unbacked by R&D effort and
investment in physical capital (learning by doing), can be a continual source of
productivity growth. A positive value of  would imply that the economy is
guaranteed a "free lunch" forever. To be sure, such an assumption would guarantee
that growth in aggregate consumption was sustainable. In fact, that would be its
attraction: it would enable us to assume away problems of environmental and
resource scarcities. But there are no theoretical or empirical grounds for presuming
that it is a reasonable assumption. At this point in our understanding of the process by
which discoveries are made, it makes greater sense to set  = 0 in (35), (which would
imply that ∂Vt/∂t = 0).47 This thought is reinforced by the observation that most
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 Solow assumed in particular that Q′(Z2) = 0.
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 Jorgenson (1995) contains a masterly account of this complex literature.
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 Lau (1996) reports on a series of studies that have specified the aggregate production function to be
of the form Yt = F(AtKt
a
Ht
(1-a)
, Lt), where K is physical capital, H is human capital, A is the augmentation
factor of the composite capital, L is the number of labour-hours, and 0 < a < 1. The studies have
uncovered that, since the end of the Second World-War, the contribution of technical progress (i.e. the
percentage rate of change in At) to growth in Yt in today’s newly industrialized countries has been
negligible. He also reports that, if new knowledge is taken to be embodied in new capital-equipment, the
contribution of growth in the value of At to growth in Yt among western industrialized economies has
been a mere 10 percent, that of growth in physical capital some 75 percent, while the contributions of
growth in human capital and labour-hours have each been some 7 percent. Lau also notes that the
environmental resources go unrecorded in growth accounting. The implication is
obvious: when we regress growth in GNP on growth in inputs which exclude the use
of environmental resources, we obtain too high an estimate of  if in fact the use of
such resources has been growing. In adopting this position, I am not suggesting that
there is no such thing as technical change; what I am suggesting is that of the first two
terms on the right-hand-side of equation (37), it is the second term which is significant.
It denotes the contribution of technical change to productivity growth.
Productivity growth in equation (37) is productivity growth in GNP. It has
often been suggested that we should instead be interested in productivity growth in
NNP, as defined in equation (36). For example, in their important early work on
Indonesia, Repetto et al. (1989) showed that if one were to include deforestation, soil
erosion, and the depreciation of oil reserves in the country’s national accounts,
Indonesia’s rate of growth in NNP during the 1980s would be half the estimated
growth rate of her GNP. And there are other environmental and natural resources that
Repetto et al. did not consider.
In Section A.6 it was shown that NNP comparisons across time tell us nothing
about changes in social well-being unless an economy is in a steady state. It was also
shown that we should ask instead if, in the aggregate, net investment is positive. It is
possible for an economy’s GNP (per head) to increase over a period of time even while,
in the aggregate, net investment (per head) is negative. I know of no evidence that in
recent years this has not been experienced in a number of countries.
48
A.11 Commentary
Green NNP has widely been interpreted as constant-equivalent consumption.
In Section A.5 it was shown that, excepting for the uninteresting case where U is linear
in consumption (or else homogeneous of degree less than one), this interpretation is
simply false. What is true is that the Hamiltonian which equals constant-equivalent
utility (Proposition 2). However, since the Hamiltonian is typically a non-linear
function of consumption and leisure, it is of little practical use.
                                                                                                                                                                    
studies are silent on whether technical progress in Western industrialized economies has been exogenous
or the fruit of expenditures on research and development.
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 Serageldin (1995) contains a report on the beginnings of this research programme.
57
In developing the concept of NNP I have made use of a series of models of
increasing generality. However, of necessity even the most general of the models had
important features missing. I comment on a few of them. Readers can easily fill in the
details.
(1) Problems associated with intragenerational distribution have been ignored.
However, it is theoretically a simple matter to include them. The way to do it would be
to enlarge the set of commodities so as to distinguish a good consumed or supplied by
one person from that same good consumed or supplied by another person. This
means, for example, that a piece of clothing worn by a poor person should be regarded
as a different commodity from that same type of clothing worn by a rich person. Such
commodities are called "named goods" (Hahn, 1971). Accounting prices of named
goods would typically depend on the names attached to them. With this re-
interpretation of goods and services, the results we have obtained continue to hold.
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(2) Environmental externalities can be incorporated by a device identical to (1)
above. To describe who is affected, in which manner, and by whose actions involves
the use of named goods and services. It follows that accounting prices would be
"named", so as to distinguish private costs from social costs and private benefits from
social benefits. Indeed, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies on externalities can be computed
on the basis of named accounting prices (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, ch. 3; Mäler, 1991;
Freeman, 1992).
(3) Uncertainty has been avoided here. Assume then that social well-being at
date t=0 is the expected value of the present discounted flow of utility. The natural
move would be to make use of the idea of contingent goods, and therefore of
contingent accounting prices. Our analysis would then go through.
(4) The discussion has been restricted to closed economies. However, the
analysis can be extended to an economy that trades with the rest of the world.
Dasgupta, Kriström and Mäler (1995) and Sefton and Weale (1996) contain an account
of this.
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 I am assuming in this example that income or wealth mal-distribution is the cause of concern.
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) suggested the use of income distributional weights as a rough-and-
ready way to capture such concern. The Bergson social welfare function was designed precisely to
incorporate these considerations.
(5) Human capital has been absent from the discussion. Analytically it is not
difficult to include it. Human capital can be thought of as another form of capital. So
net investment in it would be included in NNP (see Dasgupta, Kriström and Mäler,
1995, for a formulation). However, unlike physical capital, human capital is non-
transferable. So they should be regarded as named goods.
(6) The models studied here have not included demographic change. It is
customary in growth accounting to regard changes in population over time as
exogenously given. However, in many societies parents regard children as both an end
in themselves and a means to other things (e.g. income security). So population needs
to be regarded as a stock whose movements over time are, at least in part,
endogenously determined. The problem is that our current understanding of the
determinants of fertility behaviour is weak. Moreover, serious problems arise when
one comes to construct intergenerational welfare economics in such a world. There is
no received theory. Population ethics is an underdeveloped field of inquiry. For the
moment it would seem reasonable to conduct such analyses as we have conducted
conditional on specified demographic movements. This has been our approach here.
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Finally, it is as well to re-stress that this Appendix been about conceptual
matters only. The findings here imply that the estimation of accounting prices should
now be a priority. This said, it must be acknowledged that estimating the accounting
prices of certain categories of resources will prove to be impossible. So no single index
could suffice. But this means that tradeoffs would have to be made explicitly (e.g. how
much biodiversity should be permitted to be destroyed for the sake of so many dollars
of aggregate income?). These are hard choices, even tragic choices. But I believe they
are unavoidable.
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 See Dasgupta (1998) for a discussion of some of the more transparent problems that arise when one
thinks about the concept of optimum population.
Table 1
Living Standards’ Indicators in 1980
(Y) C E L R1 R2
Bangladesh  (540) 491 48 26 4 4
Benin  (534) 427 47 28 7 7
Bolivia (1529) 1147 50 63 3 5
Botswana (1477) 827 55 35 3 2
Burundi  (333) 393 46 25 6 7
C.A.R.  (487) 536 47 33 7 7
Chad  (353) 339 42 15 6 6
China (1619) 955 67 69 6 6
Ecuador (2607) 1642 63 81 3 5
Egypt  (995) 657 58 44 5 5
Ethiopia  (325) 260 44 15 7 7
Haiti  (696) 633 52 23 6 7
Honduras (1075) 720 60 60 3 6
India  (614) 423 54 36 3 2
Indonesia (1063) 606 53 62 5 5
Jordan (1885) 1372 62 70 6 6
Kenya  (662) 430 55 47 5 5
Korea (2369) 1486 67 93 5 5
Lesotho  (694) 1106 52 52 4 5
Liberia  (680) 374 52 25 4 6
Madagascar  (589) 437 51 50 5 5
Malawi  (417) 334 44 25 6 6
Mali  (356) 288 44 10 7 7
Mauritania  (576) 271 43 17 6 6
Mauritius (1484) 1042 65 85 2 4
Morocco (1200) 803 57 28 4 3
Nepal  (490) 456 45 19 6 5
Niger  (441) 309 42 10 6 7
Nigeria  (824) 511 48 34 3 5
Pakistan  (990) 821 49 24 5 6
Paraguay (1979) 1464 66 84 5 5
Philippines (1551) 1039 61 75 5 5
Rwanda  (379) 322 45 50 5 6
Senegal  (744) 655 45 10 3 4
Sierra L.  (512) 394 38 15 5 6
Somalia  (415) 324 44 60 7 7
Sri Lanka (1200) 509 68 85 3 2
Sudan  (652) 554 46 32 5 5
Swaziland (1079) 550 51 65 6 5
Tanzania  (353) 275 50 79 6 6
Thailand (1694) 1117 62 86 4 6
Tunisia (1845) 1107 60 62 6 5
Uganda  (257) 252 46 52 7 7
Zaire  (224) 168 49 55 6 7
Zambia  (716) 387 50 44 5 5
Zimbabwe  (930) 586 55 69 5 5
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Key: Y - per capita GNP (international dollars)
C - per capita private consumption (international dollars)
E - life expectancy at birth (years)
L - adult literacy rate (%)
R1- index of political rights
R2- index of civil rights
Abbreviations: C.A.R. (Central African Republic) and Sierra L. (Sierra Leone).
Source: World Bank (1982) and Dasgupta and Weale (1992)
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Table 2
Rankings of Living Standards Data for 1980
               BORDA    C       E       L      R1      R2 (Y)                   RANK                                                 
 Mali           1       6        5       1       1       1    7
 Ethiopia       1       3        5       4       1       1    3
 Niger          3       7        2       1       7       1   11
 Mauritania     4       4        4       7       7      11   17
 Chad           5      11        2       4       7      11    6
 Malawi         6      10        5      10       7      11   10
 Uganda         6       2       12      27       1       1    2
 Burundi        8      14       12      11       7       1  4
 Somalia        9       9        5      30       1       1    9
 Benin         10      17       15      15       1       1   15
 Sierra L.     11      15        1       4      20      11   14
 Zaire         12       1       19      29       7       1    1
 C.A.R.        13      24       15      18       1       1   12
 Nepal         14      20        9       8       7      23   13
 Haiti         15      29       26       9       7       1   24
 Rwanda        16       8        9      25      20      11    8
 Tanzania      17       5       21      40       7      11    5
 Liberia       18      12       26      11      33      11   22
 Pakistan      19      34       19      10      20      11   29
 Sudan         20      26       12      17      20      23   20
 Zambia        21      13       21      22      20      23   25
 Madagascar    22      19       24      25      20      23   18
 Swaziland     23      25       24      35       7      23   33
 Kenya         24      18       31      24      20      23   21
 Senegal       25      30        9       1      38      40   26
 Nigeria       26      23       17      19      38      23   27
 Bangladesh    27      21       17      14      33      40   16
 Egypt         28      31       35      22      20      23   30
 Indonesia     29      28       29      32      20      23   31
 China         30      36       44      36       7      11   40
 Zimbabwe      31      27       31      36      20      23   28
 Jordan        32      43       39      38       7      11   43
 Tunisia       32      40       36      32       7      23   42
 Honduras      34      32       36      30      38      11   32
 India         35      16       29      21      38      44   19
 Lesotho       35      39       26      27      33      23   23
 Philippines   37      37       38      39      20      23   39
 Bolivia       38      42       21      34      38      23   38
 Morocco       38      33       34      15      33      43   35
 Botswana      40      35       31      20      38      44   36
 Thailand      41      41       39      45      33      11   41
 Paraguay      42      44       43      42      20      23   43
 Korea         43      45       44      46      20      23   45
 Ecuador       44      46       41      41      38      23   46
 Sri Lanka     45      22       46      43      38      44   34
 Mauritius     46      38       42      43      46      40   36
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Key:  BORDA RANK - ranking using Borda Rule
    C - per capita private consumption (international dollars)
E - life expectancy at birth (years)
L - adult literacy rate (%)
R1- index of political rights
R2- index of civil rights
Y - per capita GNP (international dollars)
Abbreviations: C.A.R. (Central African Republic), and Sierra L. (Sierra Leone).
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Table 3
(Spearman) Correlation Matrix of Living Standard Rankings
C 0.84
E 0.88 0.75
L 0.72 0.54 0.79
R1 0.76 0.51 0.48 0.28
R2 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.76
Y 0.87 0.91 0.83 0.61 0.55 0.57
 Borda C E L R1 R2
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